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ABSTRACT: This report summarizes Minnesota’s efforts to transform its delivery system, 
focusing on landmark legislation passed in 2008, but also looking at the many public and private 
initiatives that preceded its passage. It describes Minnesota’s experience to date with developing 
and implementing these reforms. Minnesota’s 2008 legislation contained a number of specific 
elements with significant potential to achieve overall health care cost savings. In addition to 
establishing and funding a statewide health improvement program, and enhancements to coverage, 
the law included various provisions to collect and report data to achieve price and quality 
transparency, as well as provisions to support care redesign and payment reform; these latter 
provisions are the focus of this report. 
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
This report summarizes Minnesota’s efforts to transform its health care delivery 
system. Although the primary focus is on the landmark legislation passed by the state 
legislature in 2008, we also look at the many public and private initiatives that preceded it. 
In describing Minnesota’s experience to date with developing and implementing these 
reforms, the report aims to inform other states’ efforts to control costs and improve value 
throughout their health care systems. While implementation is a work in progress, a great 
deal has been accomplished already, and not surprisingly, new challenges have been 
uncovered. With numerous new opportunities for pilot initiatives in the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010, these lessons will also contribute to national policy 
discussion. 
 
Minnesota’s health care environment has numerous strengths as a starting point 
for reform: a small uninsured population, a strong base of employer-provided insurance, 
and a history of public–private partnership. Exhibit ES-1 illustrates Minnesota’s health 
coverage compared with the nation. For many uninsured Minnesotans, the Medicaid 
program offers comprehensive benefits with some of the highest standards in the country. 
The Health Care Access Fund, a special revenue fund supported by provider and 
premium taxes, helps manage the MinnesotaCare program for low-income individuals. 
The private sector was instrumental in creatively piloting data collection on quality and 
costs, reporting on physician performance, and developing innovative payment methods 
to reward quality and value for bundled care. 
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 Exhibit ES-1. Individuals by Coverage in Minnesota and the United States
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Source: Urban Institute and Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured estimates based on the Census Bureau’s 
March 2008 and 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS: Annual Social and Economic Supplements).  
 
Minnesota’s 2008 legislation contained a number of specific elements with 
significant potential to achieve overall health care cost savings. In addition to establishing 
and funding a statewide health improvement program, enhancements related to coverage 
for low-income uninsured people, and steps to increase consumer engagement in all 
aspects of the system, the law included various provisions to collect and report data to 
achieve price and quality transparency, and as well as provisions to support care redesign 
and payment reform; these two sets of initiatives are the focus of this report. 
 
Key legislative provisions to support the collection and reporting of data are: 
• Development of a standardized statewide set of quality-of-care measures; 
• Collection and use of all-payer encounter data and contracted prices, building on 
administrative simplification requirements passed in 2007 that call for all health 
care payers and providers to conduct eligibility, claims, and remittance 
transactions electronically, with the condition that all plans submit the detailed 
claims data to a common data aggregator; and 
• Transparent ranking of providers based on a combination of risk-adjusted cost and 
quality (the “provider peer grouping” system, which was modified by legislation 
passed in 2009). 
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 Key legislative provisions to support care redesign and payment reform are: 
• Uniform definitions for at least seven “baskets of care” and standard quality 
measurements for those baskets; 
• A single, statewide system of quality-based incentive payments to providers to be 
used by public and private payers; and 
• Standards of certification for “health care homes” to coordinate care for people 
with complex or chronic conditions and additional care coordination payments to 
those homes meeting the standards, with recertification standards based on 
process, outcomes, and quality measures as well as evaluation of cost impact. 
 
 
Exhibit ES-2. Summary of Legislation and Progress as of January 2010 
Data Collection  
and Reporting 
  
 Statewide measures and  
all-payer database 
What it is: Standardized set of quality measures for 
health care providers across the state. 
 
Progress: Uniform definitions and measures have 
developed. Registration of medical groups in data 
portal and identification of populations are under 
way. On January 1, 2010, providers started 
submitting data on the measures; these will be 
publicly reported in July 2010. 
 
Implementation challenges: There is no 
enforcement mechanism for data collection in place 
or under development. Questions arise about future 
innovation in developing new measures or reporting 
mechanisms. 
 Provider peer grouping system What it is: A method for comparing health care 
providers based on a combination of risk-adjusted 
cost and quality. 
 
Progress: On July 1, 2009, collection of encounter 
data from health plans and third-party 
administrators began. Data will be disseminated to 
providers in June 2010. By January 2011, the state 
employee health plan, state public insurance 
programs, local units of government, and private 
health plans must use these tools to strengthen 
incentives for consumers to choose high-quality, 
low-cost providers. 
 
Implementation challenges: Though the provider 
peer grouping system has conceptual support from 
all stakeholders, the technical details and 
program’s design are making implementation 
difficult. Questions also arise about the policy’s 
potential impact on access. 
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 Care Redesign and 
Payment Reform 
  
 Baskets of care What it is: A collection of the services, paid 
separately under a fee-for-service system, but 
usually combined by a provider in delivering a full 
diagnostic or treatment procedure to a patient. 
 
Progress: Uniform definitions for seven “baskets of 
care” were established by July 2009, with an eighth 
basket added later that year. Standard quality 
measures were established by December 2009. In 
January 2010, providers offering these baskets 
were able to establish their own prices for them, 
and quality information will be publicly available 
beginning July 2010. 
 
Implementation challenges: A number of 
operational issues still require resolution. A second 
key question is whether these standard definitions 
will be used in the market, since their use is entirely 
voluntary. 
 Quality incentive payments What it is: A statewide system of quality-based 
incentive payments to health care providers. 
 
Progress: Incentive payment design was completed 
in July 2009, and by July of the following year, the 
payment system must be implemented for 
participants in the state employee health plan and 
enrollees in state public insurance programs. 
 
Implementation challenges: Distinguishing the 
quality incentive payment system from the multiple 
pay-for-performance programs already in the state 
is an obstacle. 
 Health care homes What it is: An approach to primary care in which 
providers, families, and patients work in partnership 
to improve health outcomes and quality of life for 
patients. 
 
Progress: Standards and procedures for 
certification and recertification for health care 
homes were adopted January 11, 2010. 
 
Implementation challenges: Despite widespread 
support for the concept of better coordinated care 
through a patient-centered health care home, the 
definition of that home remains controversial. There 
is also debate over the coordination of payments in 
this system. 
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 Although Minnesota has a unique health care environment, the state’s experiences 
with payment and delivery reform illustrate successes and challenges that are applicable 
to other states wrestling with rising health care costs. Key lessons focus on the process of 
adopting and then implementing reforms, as it is too early to assess outcomes. Those 
lessons are: 
 
• Leadership across the public and private sectors at every stage was critical to 
developing recommendations and passing legislation. 
• Stakeholders acknowledged that the issues were complex and required, 
throughout the development process, vigilant articulation of the goals and 
willingness to compromise. 
• System reform, when framed as controlling costs and improving value, propels 
bipartisan support. 
• Although Minnesota’s payment and transparency reforms did not go as far as 
some proponents wanted, the elements that did pass in 2008 are critical building 
blocks for future reforms. 
• An imperfect package is far preferable to the “do nothing” alternative, but 
questions remain as to whether it will actually work as expected. 
• There are mixed views about the ambitious timetable, but the positive aspects 
appear to outweigh the negative. 
• To transform the system, a majority of the stakeholders must be affected. It is 
unclear whether the legislation, with voluntary adoption of reforms by the private 
sector, is sufficient for real reform. Furthermore, it is widely recognized that 
Medicare’s participation in the rest of Minnesota’s reforms would truly increase 
the chances of successfully transforming the delivery system. 
• Payment and transparency reforms require an upfront investment; many states are 
unlikely to be in Minnesota’s fiscal position to fund them. 
 
Minnesota’s 2008 health reform legislation did not go as far on payment reform 
as some proponents had wanted, but still puts in place important reforms to change 
payment mechanisms and care delivery through data collection and reporting, as well as 
through designing payments to encourage coordination and efficient delivery. Given all 
the previous activity in the state, the law was perhaps more evolutionary than 
revolutionary, but the elements needed for real transformation are all there. Notably, 
 ix
 there is significant commitment to transformation from every stakeholder group, and all 
of them will be fully involved with implementation. 
 
Whether the voluntary nature of some of the reforms’ adoption will lead to the 
critical mass of support envisioned—and needed—remains to be seen, but the evident 
public and private leadership leaves us cautiously optimistic. Were Medicare to join the 
state’s efforts, the chances for success would improve. The opportunities provided by the 
new Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 for states to pilot-test payment 
reform and transparency initiatives appear to make such collaboration possible. 
 
Currently, the accountable care organization concept has a great deal of traction in 
the state, with much interest in some kind of better-organized system that can accept 
bundled payment. The state’s reforms are important building blocks for this concept, and 
Minnesota will be an excellent testing ground. 
 
Finally, this report illustrates that passing legislation is only a first step toward 
health system reform. It points to the value of assessing early content and process lessons, 
both to improve what is under way locally and to inform other states seeking to solve the 
same difficult problems. As Minnesota learns, so will the nation. 
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 REFORMING HEALTH CARE DELIVERY THROUGH 
PAYMENT CHANGE AND TRANSPARENCY: 
MINNESOTA’S INNOVATIONS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As consensus grows that current health care payment methods work in opposition to 
efforts to control costs and improve value, the state of Minnesota is implementing a series 
of reforms aimed at transforming the health care delivery system. Passed in 2008, 
Minnesota’s landmark legislation contained a number of elements to achieve the Institute 
for Healthcare Improvement’s “Triple Aim” goals of simultaneously improving the 
health of the population, the patient/consumer experience, and the affordability of health 
care.1
 
This report describes Minnesota’s experience to date with developing and 
implementing these reforms. Its purpose is to inform other states’ efforts to design 
strategies for controlling costs and improving value. While implementation is a work in 
progress, a great deal has been accomplished already, and not surprisingly, new 
challenges have been uncovered. With the numerous new opportunities for pilot 
programs in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, these lessons will 
also contribute to national policy discussion. 
 
The story is a rich one. Through review of numerous public documents and 
through structured confidential interviews with 20 key informants—including 
representatives from the state (executive branch and legislature), plans, providers, 
business, and consumers—we learned about the policy choices considered and selected, 
the contributions made by the state and private stakeholders, the key decisions that were 
made along the way, the plans for implementation, and the lessons learned to date. (See 
Appendix A for a list of key informants.) We learned about the unique aspects of 
Minnesota’s environment that affected all of these things. We heard a great deal of 
consensus, but also differing points of view about how the package came to pass and 
what the prospects for real impact appear to be. These judgments are presented 
throughout the report but are especially used in framing the key lessons. Participants were 
eager to share their experiences and felt officials in other states would benefit from 
Minnesota’s lessons learned and challenges. 
 
In the sections that follow, we first present an overview of the specific elements 
included in this study. After a short section on the Minnesota context (which refers to 
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 supplemental information in Appendix B), we lay out the accomplishments to date for 
each reform and the current implementation issues needing resolution or further work. 
The key lessons comprise the next section and focus on the process of passing the 
reforms in addition to observations about the content of what did and did not pass. 
Throughout, references are included to documents that can be found on the Internet for 
additional detailed information. 
 
OVERVIEW OF MINNESOTA’S REFORMS 
Minnesota’s 2008 legislation contained a number of specific elements with significant 
potential for overall health care cost savings; reforms that at the time of enactment were 
estimated to have a potential savings of approximately 12 percent (or $6.9 billion) by 
2015 compared with baseline spending projections.2 In addition to establishing and 
funding a statewide health improvement program, enhancements related to coverage for 
low-income uninsured people, and steps to increase consumer engagement in all aspects 
of the system, the law included various provisions to collect and report data to achieve 
price and quality transparency, and as well as provisions to support care redesign and 
payment reform; these two sets of initiatives are the focus of this report. 
 
Key legislative provisions to support the collection and reporting of data are: 
• Development of a standardized statewide set of quality-of-care measures; 
• Collection and use of all-payer encounter data and contracted prices, building on 
administrative simplification requirements passed in 2007 that call for all health 
care payers and providers to conduct eligibility, claims, and remittance 
transactions electronically, with the condition that all plans submit the detailed 
claims data to a common data aggregator; and 
• Transparent ranking of providers based on a combination of risk-adjusted cost and 
quality (the “provider peer grouping” system, which was modified by legislation 
passed in 2009). 
 
Key legislative provisions to support care redesign and payment reform are: 
• Uniform definitions for at least seven “baskets of care” and standard quality 
measurements for those baskets 
• A single, statewide system of quality-based incentive payments to providers to be 
used by public and private payers; and 
• Standards of certification for “health care homes” to coordinate care for people 
with complex or chronic conditions and additional care coordination payments to 
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 those homes meeting the standards, with recertification standards based on 
process, outcomes and quality measures as well as evaluation of cost impact. 
 
Two important payment reform provisions were discussed during the debate over 
the legislation, but ultimately they were not included in the final bill. One was the 
establishment of a single price for provider services across all health insurance plans, 
which was intended to make it easier for consumers to understand and use cost 
information and remove plans’ ability to compete through discounts they were able to 
negotiate. The other was a system, known to the health policy community in the state as 
“Level 3” or “total cost of care,” where provider groups and care systems would submit 
bids for the total cost of care for a given population, and consumers would select systems 
based on cost and quality. Payments to providers would be risk-adjusted based on the 
health of the population, and there would be accountability for quality. As will be 
discussed further, total cost of care was not included in the final bill because of political 
and provider concerns, but subsequently many providers have developed a more positive 
view of the concept. In place of this provision, the compromise included the provider 
peer grouping system and collection of data for the all-payer database, building blocks for 
reaching the goal of implementing total cost and quality of care payment. 
 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR REFORM 
Minnesota has a long history of being at the forefront of health care reform, expanding 
coverage, using managed care, and encouraging dialogue and collaboration among health 
care professionals. Despite the problems of too many uninsured, a system where costs 
were rising unsustainably, and quality was variable and below what could be attained, 
Minnesota was in a relatively good place when considering the 2008 legislation. 
 
Minnesota’s health care environment had numerous strengths as a starting 
point for reform. The state has a low 8.4 percent of the adult population living without 
health insurance, ranking third in the county, and has a strong base of employer-provided 
insurance.3 Exhibit 1 illustrates Minnesota’s coverage compared with the nation. For 
many uninsured Minnesotans, the Medicaid program offers comprehensive benefits with 
some of the highest standards in the country. According to The Commonwealth Fund’s 
State Scorecard, Minnesota leads the nation in indicators of healthy lives.4 The health 
care marketplace, unlike other states, is largely not-for-profit. The health plans that do 
business in Minnesota report low administrative costs—on average 8 percent, compared 
with national averages of 16 percent.5 The state is also home to some of the most 
prestigious and progressive medical centers in the country. There is a high concentration 
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 of large, integrated multispecialty practices and hospital systems, and a low level of 
physicians in solo practice compared with the rest of the nation. 
 
Exhibit 1. Individuals by Coverage in Minnesota and the United States
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Source: Urban Institute and Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured estimates based on the Census Bureau’s 
March 2008 and 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS: Annual Social and Economic Supplements).  
 
In addition, the state has a dedicated Health Care Access Fund, supported by a 2 
percent tax on providers and a 1 percent tax on fully-insured premiums. Most of the 
fund’s resources help manage the MinnesotaCare program by providing direct 
appropriations and covering the state and federal share of MinnesotaCare enrollee 
premiums, though funds also are used to support quality and access initiatives through a 
number of programs. The fund supports the Office of Rural Health and Primary Care 
with rural hospital and clinic grants, technical assistance, and health workforce data 
collection. The Health Care Access Fund further contributes to the Department of Health, 
Department of Human Services, and the University of Minnesota’s data collection, data 
analysis, policy development, and other health reform analytic work.6,7
 
Minnesota has a rich history of substantial health reform discussions 
involving public and private stakeholders, which paved the way for the current 
reforms. Over the past two decades, the strong collaborative environment has laid the 
groundwork for public and private leadership toward managed care, early adoption of 
HIPAA and public reporting on a voluntary basis, health information exchanges, and 
creating community measurement standards. The issue of health reform has been 
percolating for a long time in Minnesota. In 1992 the legislature, with the support of 
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 Governor Arne Carlson, passed health care reform known as MinnesotaCare, a 
government subsidized health plan for Minnesotans with a low to moderate income who 
are unable to access insurance on their own. Despite the firm groundwork on access and 
coverage, the rising cost of health care in the state is unsustainable. Serious discussions 
about cost began early in the decade, when the average total cost of health care for a 
Minnesota household in 2003 was roughly $11,000,8 and reports projected that this 
number would double by 2010 if current trends continued. Health expenditures per capita 
also saw an average annual growth of 6.47 percent, rising faster than national health 
expenditures9 (Exhibit 2). Total health care spending in Minnesota went up 70 percent 
from 2000 to 2007.10 The state was looking at a future reduction in access and quality  
of care, with increased burden on individuals, employers, and the state to cover these  
cost increases. 
 
Exhibit 2. Health Care Expenditures per Capita 
in Minnesota and the United States, 1991–2004
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Sources: Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Expenditure Data, Health Expenditures by State of Residence; 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary, National Health Statistics Group, released Sept. 2007,
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/res-us.pdf.  
 
In 2005, the Minnesota Medical Association brought together leaders in health 
care, business, state government, labor, education, and consumer advocacy to develop a 
comprehensive health care reform plan, and in March 2006 the coalition released Healthy 
Minnesota: A Partnership for Reform to serve as a starting point for developing 
partnerships. Healthy Minnesota proposed health reform legislation that the legislature 
considered but did not pass in 2007. The Health Care Transformation Task Force (TTF), 
created in 2007 by the Minnesota legislature, which required the Governor to convene a 
Task Force to develop an action plan to improve affordability, access, quality of health 
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 care, and the health status of Minnesotans. To address cost, the TTF made a variety of 
recommendations in its January 2008 report, many of which were later incorporated in 
the 2008 reform legislation. At the same time, the Legislative Commission on Health 
Care Access created work groups to address a continuum of health care issues and its 
report, issued in February 2008, contained many of the same recommendations. (See 
Appendix B for more information on these recommendations.) 
 
Minnesota’s innovations in the private sector and through public–private 
collaborations paved the way for the current reforms. The private sector was deeply 
involved in the 2008 payment reform law, building on years of innovation in the 
marketplace. Without government mandates or legislative action, the business and 
provider community are creatively piloting data collection on quality and costs, reporting 
on physician performance, and developing innovative payment methods to reward quality 
and value for bundled care. 
 
Starting in the early 1990s, there were several movements that built momentum 
and experience for the current reforms. The Buyers Health Care Action Group (BHCAG) 
is a 27-member coalition representing 200,000 Minnesotans. The group is composed of 
some large employers, such as General Mills, Honeywell, 3M, Pillsbury, and American 
Express, who contracted directly with care systems and structured their benefits to 
provide patients with incentives to choose systems that demonstrate higher-quality, 
lower-cost care. Ultimately, BHCAG’s efforts evolved into Patient Choice Healthcare, 
Inc., formed in 2000, which sorts providers into tiers based on cost and quality standards 
in their benefit packages. Although the programs are innovative, they serve a small 
number of self-funded employers. But the focus on consumer choice using both cost and 
quality measures paved the way for the private marketplace to develop packages of care 
based on the total cost of care. In 2006, a company called Carol.com was founded by 
Tony Miller to create 53 packages of care around specific medical issues such as asthma, 
anesthesia, or pathology. Consumers are able to compare costs, read consumer reviews, 
and schedule appointments from a single Web site.11 While there was much interest 
around packaging health care into comparable units, there was little traction in the health 
care marketplace; nevertheless, the concept found its way into the 2008 legislation as 
“baskets of care.” 
 
Three additional efforts have played a significant role in the Minnesota reform 
environment. The Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement (ICSI) was started in 1993 
by a major health plan (subsequently joined by others starting in 2001; ICSI is currently 
supported by six health plans) to develop and disseminate evidence-based clinical 
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 guidelines and support quality improvement collaboration to redesign care. Minnesota 
Community Measurement (MNCM) was founded in 2000 by the ICSI member health 
plans (and later joined by the Minnesota Medical Association) to develop joint 
performance reports on costs and quality at the medical group level. Data are submitted 
(until the current reforms) voluntarily by most of Minnesota’s providers. And the Smart 
Buy Alliance was formed in 2004 out of a coalition of public and private health care 
purchasers to have enough combined market power to demand quality and value from 
health plans and providers. (See Appendix B for additional information on these efforts.) 
 
CURRENT STATUS: KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
Minnesota’s reforms are a work in progress. This section provides additional detail about 
each of the major initiatives and reports on the accomplishments as of late 2009. In each 
section we discuss the major issues remaining to be resolved, as reported in our 
interviews. Importantly, while there were varying views about the status of 
implementation and some of the choices made so far, there is a pervasive public and 
private commitment to the reform goals. 
 
DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING 
Standardized Statewide Quality Measures and All-Payer Database12
The 2008 law requires the Commissioner of Health to establish a standardized set of 
quality measures for health care providers across the state. The measures must be based 
on medical evidence, must be developed through a process in which health care providers 
participate, and must be reviewed on at least an annual basis. In addition, the measures must: 
 
• Include uniform definitions, measures, and forms for submission of data, to the 
extent possible; 
• Seek to avoid increasing the administrative burden on health care providers; 
• Be initially based on existing quality indicators for physician and hospital  
services, which are measured and reported publicly by quality measurement 
organizations including, but not limited to, MNCM and specialty societies; 
• Place a priority on health care outcomes rather than processes where possible; and 
• Incorporate those for primary care, including preventive services, coronary artery 
and heart disease, diabetes, asthma, depression, and others as determined by the 
commissioner. 
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 The commissioner also is required to establish a system for risk-adjusting quality 
measures, and to issue annual public reports on provider quality beginning July 1, 2010. 
The specifics of the risk adjustment are still under development. Those reports will 
comprise a subset of the measures in the standardized set. 
 
The 2008 health reform legislation requires data collection from all payers and 
providers on all the measures established by the commissioner. These data will be used in 
all of the initiatives described over time for reporting and payment on quality and value. 
Physician clinics and hospitals must begin to submit data on the standardized quality 
measures starting January 1, 2010. For 2010, these quality measures include data on 
optimal diabetes care and optimal vascular care, as well as a survey on health information 
technology.13 After January 1, 2010, health plans may not require providers to submit 
data on any measure outside this standardized set. The Minnesota Department of Health, 
Minnesota Medical Association, and Minnesota Community Care have begun registering 
medical groups on the data portal, identifying populations, and collecting patient clinical 
data. The Minnesota Department of Health will publicly report on data in July 2010. 
Health plans and providers may still voluntarily work on using and/or developing new 
measures, which can be incorporated through rule-making into the standardized set. 
 
The all-payer electronic database explicitly builds on a number of existing public 
and private efforts already under way, and the law specified that the commissioner must 
ensure that any data-reporting obligations established under the new requirements are not 
duplicative of publicly reported, communitywide quality-reporting activities currently 
under way in Minnesota.14
 
In 2003, Minnesota passed legislation implementing data collection from 
hospitals and insurers for Minnesota’s State Health Database.15 In addition, the 
Minnesota Hospital Association acts as the voluntary nonprofit reporting organization for 
the collection, review, and submission of financial, utilization, and services information 
of licensed hospitals in the state of Minnesota through the Hospital Annual Report, 
maintaining these data in the Health Care Cost Information System (HCCIS). There are 
over 500 data elements in this database.16 And as described, Minnesota Community 
Measurement was already voluntarily collecting health care data from physicians and 
hospitals, achieving an approximately 85 percent reporting rate among providers.17
 
In addition, a previous administrative simplification law supports the current data 
collection and reporting efforts. Passed in 2007, the Uniform Electronic Transaction and 
Implementation Guide Standards law18 requires all health care payers and providers to 
conduct eligibility, claims, and remittance transactions electronically using a single 
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 standard for content and format; the rules took effect July 15, 2009.19 This change was 
implemented in part to reduce the administrative costs of processing paper claims, but 
standardization also benefits data collection for the all-payer claims database. 
Compliance is being pursued on a voluntary basis at this time. 
 
In 2008, Minnesota Community Measurement was contracted by the Minnesota 
Department of Health (MDH) to build a unified statewide quality reporting system for 
health care providers, to expand the number of quality measures for public reporting, to 
increase the number of physician clinics reporting data, and to enhance consumer access 
and understanding of the quality measures. Their contract also includes developing the 
quality incentive payment system, described below. Minnesota Community Measurement 
first produced a comprehensive national inventory of existing incentive payment systems, 
pay-for-performance systems, and other payment systems, as well as an inventory of 
performance measures in current use for pay-for-performance programs, and made 
recommendations regarding the quality measures for public reporting in their report on 
February 6, 2009.20 Their plan suggested introducing measures in a staged fashion over 
four years between 2009 and 2012, in a three-stage process: identifying new measures, 
collecting the necessary data for the measures, and public reporting on the measures. 
 
On September 8, 2009, MDH published a proposed rule that defines the 
Minnesota Statewide Quality Reporting and Measurement System, details the initial 
measures to be collected, establishes the process for adding to the system and refining it 
over time, and establishes a mandatory reporting framework for the measures.21,22 The 
measures included in the rule were selected based in part on recommendations from work 
groups that included representation from health care providers, health plans, employers 
and consumers or from measures that are already reported and available. The Health Care 
Quality Measures–Hospital Quality Reporting Steering Committee met five times in 2009. 
The initial proposed physician clinic measures for public reporting are primarily 
measures that are already being reported on a voluntary basis. The initial proposed 
hospital measures for public reporting are indicators that are already reported by many 
hospitals or may be calculated from existing data. The first hospital measures are ones 
that hospitals already report to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The 
number of measures is expected to expand over time, as noted in department reports and 
in the Steering Committee minutes. 
 
Implementation Issues 
Building on the experience of voluntary data collection has much strength, 
but the new system has new issues to resolve. Prior to the reform law, health plans and 
 9
 many providers had extensive experience reporting data to Minnesota Community 
Measurement. All major plans participate in MNCM, as do the majority of the hospitals 
and physicians in the state, and because MNCM was developed by plans with a great deal 
of stakeholder buy-in, numerous observers report that MNCM has provider trust, which 
mitigates the impetus to submit data that game the system. Several issues arose through 
the interviews, however: 
 
• Although all physicians are required to report data, there is no straightforward 
way of knowing that they do so. In Minnesota, as in many states, there is no good 
list of practicing providers. State medical boards generally know everyone who is 
licensed to practice, but not whether they are active or not. Under MNCM’s 
voluntary system, with the estimate that 85 percent to 90 percent of providers 
were submitting data for a particular measure such as diabetes care, there was no 
good reason to develop a system to ensure 100 percent participation, but such a 
system will be necessary and more feasible now. 
 
• Despite the reporting challenge noted above, there is no enforcement mechanism 
for data collection in place or under development. Observers note that the lack 
attention to an enforcement mechanism is attributable to the positive experience 
with voluntary reporting. Indeed, several commented that providers have 
participated in voluntary data collection and reporting because they see value in 
doing so. Also, observers argue that a climate of enforcement would lead to 
gaming the system and poor quality data. 
 
• Mandatory encounter data collection for the all-payer database started before the 
quality measurement and reporting systems were operational, which was 
necessary in order for the systems to function. But several observers pointed to 
technical issues that have arisen because requirements from the all-payer database 
contractor, Onpoint Health Data (formerly the Maine Health Information Center), 
differ from what plans had previously been reporting. They comment that these 
technical issues would best be resolved by knowing specifically what will be 
needed for the quality measures. Examples of such issues are a request for data in 
a format that conflicts with Minnesota’s standard electronic format or a lack of 
clarity about whether submitted or adjudicated data are to be reported. 
 
Although the concept of one standard, statewide set of quality measures has 
appeal in many respects, questions arise about future innovation in developing new 
measures or reporting mechanisms. The development of Minnesota’s statewide quality 
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 measures is necessarily an evolving process. As noted by MNCM, reflecting their 
experience, it takes roughly three years from conceptualizing a measure to implementing 
it statewide. Each of three steps takes about a year in an interactive process—a year to 
identify and define the measure, a year for testing its validity and working with providers 
on collecting and verifying the data, and a year for developing and testing how it will be 
publicly reported. Even when using nationally endorsed measures, the implementation 
process requires collecting and testing data, as well as working with providers to find 
issues that need correction and correcting them. In addition, providers in Minnesota seek 
measures that go beyond some of those that are nationally endorsed as they push the 
envelope to improve quality; a new outcome measure for depression is under 
development, despite the existence of a national process measure, because Minnesota 
providers felt that the national measure isn’t stringent enough for the standard of care 
they seek to deliver. 
 
• Under the law, only the measures approved for the statewide standard system will 
be calculated. While private payers will be able to use others, observers expect 
that measures not in that system will fall by the wayside for most pay-for-
performance contracts. An open question is whether there will continue to be 
innovation and piloting of new measures by providers. There is clear recognition 
of the need and desire for the system to evolve; it is designed for such evolution, 
but whether the pipeline will be strengthened or weakened is unknown. 
 
• As the system evolves and new quality measures are added, it is not known 
whether the measures will be able to be calculated from the data already collected 
or if the data collection system will need to change. Also unknown is the 
administrative burden. 
 
Having trusted implementation agencies that can step forward is extremely 
useful for implementation. Although there was debate in the various bodies making 
reform recommendations as to whether to include Minnesota Community Measurement 
by name in the reform law or to refer to its characteristics more generically, there is no 
question that MNCM’s track record for collecting and reporting data contributed 
positively to the state’s ability to implement the law on an ambitious timetable. 
 
Comparing Providers: The Provider Peer Grouping System 
The 2008 health reform bill required Minnesota’s Commissioner of Health to develop by 
January 1, 2010, a method for comparing health care providers based on a combination of 
risk-adjusted cost and quality. Called provider peer grouping (PPG), the system includes: 
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 • A uniform method of calculating cost of care and relative quality of care; 
• A combined measure that includes provider risk-adjusted cost of care and quality 
of care to get a value measure that combines cost and quality; and 
• Use of encounter data and statewide quality measures to provide quality 
information and use of paid claims amounts to account for the true cost  
of services. 
 
On July 1, 2009, Minnesota began encounter data collection from health plans and 
third-party administrators. Information on relative cost and quality will be disseminated 
to health care providers beginning June 1, 2010, and will be reported publicly beginning 
in September 2010. By January 1, 2011, the state employee health plan, state public 
insurance programs, local units of government, and health plan companies must use  
these tools to strengthen incentives for consumers to choose high-quality, low-cost health 
care providers. 
 
A provider peer grouping advisory group was charged with providing 
recommendations to the commissioner on creating a methodology to be used for 
comparing health care providers on a composite measure of risk-adjusted cost and quality. 
The group was composed of members appointed by a broad cross-section of stakeholder 
organizations and was led by cochairs Jan Malcolm and Dr. Charlie Fazio. Ann Robinow 
and Andrea Kao facilitated the group. Information gathered from responses to a request 
for information (RFI) in spring 2009 was synthesized into a set of issue papers that 
served as a starting point for discussions by the advisory group. The method for 
comparing providers on cost and quality was developed in consultation with health care 
providers, health plan companies, state agencies, and organizations that work to improve 
health care quality in Minnesota. The advisory group submitted its final 
recommendations on the provider peer grouping methodology in mid-October, and the 
Minnesota Department of Health accepted comments and concerns on the 
recommendations through December 1, 2009. 
 
The law specified several ways that the PPG is to be used, primarily by public 
payers.23 By January 1, 2011, state employee insurance groups will use rankings of 
providers to strengthen incentives for members to use high-quality/low-cost providers 
and to arrange providers in tiers based on cost and quality. Political subdivisions that 
offer health care benefits will sort providers based on their cost and quality performance. 
Minnesota’s Medicaid agency will establish performance thresholds for the PPG, and 
Medicaid and state-only subsidized insurance carriers will be prohibited from contracting 
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 with the lowest 10 percent of providers. This is envisioned as a message to the system to 
improve cost and quality indicators. Providers and plans will have a year—until January 
1, 2012—before the lowest performers become ineligible to receive payments. Providers 
who are deemed necessary to ensure access to care for patients may be allowed to 
continue providing medical care and receiving payments under these programs. The 
legislation also states that providers who score in the lowest decile in any given year may 
resume participation on January 1 of the following year if their most recent combined 
cost and quality score exceeds the threshold determined by the Minnesota Department of 
Health Services (DHS). DHS has not yet developed rules for implementation, but 
informants interpret this as setting a one-time threshold; in the following year providers 
could get beyond that threshold and not be excluded. The legislation itself does not 
address the possibility of raising the lowest threshold for participation over time, but this 
concept was discussed during the debate. 
 
The law anticipates that private health plans will develop and use products and 
plan options that include PPG, such as selective provider networks, to encourage 
members to use high-quality/low-cost providers. In addition, health plans in the 
individual or small-employer market must offer at least one product that establishes 
financial incentives for consumers to choose higher-quality/lower-cost providers through 
enrollee cost-sharing or selective provider networks. 
 
Implementation Issues 
The PPG has conceptual support from all stakeholders but the proverbial 
“devil is in the details” arises across all aspects of the program’s design. The PPG 
advisory group and the commissioner have numerous issues, both technical and policy, to 
resolve in implementing this system. As one observer noted, “Can you implement this 
with standardization that holds up and is consistent and cannot be challenged in court as 
inconsistent and not meaningful?” While the technical issues are challenging, it is the 
policy issues that are likely to be most daunting going forward. Examples of both were 
readily reported by observers: 
 
• The first step in the process was to make specific recommendations in nine 
methodological categories, and these were done in relatively short order.24 The 
challenge on the technical side was to be detailed but not so detailed that the 
recommendations are not used. They covered such topics as: attributing care 
given to specific providers, risk adjustment, use of quality measures, outlier 
adjustment, how to categorize (group) providers, determining appropriate 
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 provider level for analysis, how to adjust for variations in payment levels, 
adjusting for payer mix, and types of services included. 
 
• Near the top of the challenges is how to combine the cost and quality information. 
There’s a technical side, which arguably is easiest—the cost measures come from 
the all-payer claims database while the quality measures come from clinical and 
administrative data. But more challenging is how the cost and quality measures 
are weighted in the system. How do you score low-cost/low-quality versus high-
cost/high-quality providers? How much weight should process measures be given 
versus outcome measures (which are scarce to date)? If, as is generally believed, 
quality measures are less developed than cost measures, why should they be given 
equal value to cost? 
 
• How should “like” organizations be grouped? How many levels make sense? 
How should location (i.e., rural versus urban) be taken into account? What 
happens if a particular provider doesn’t have patients that are covered by the 
quality measures used? One observer questioned whether the groupings would be 
meaningful to providers, something that would be important to spur improvement. 
 
The 2009 requirement that the lowest decile providers will be eliminated 
from participating/getting paid under state plans raised technical questions about 
the ability to define that decile with validity but even more questions about the 
policy’s potential impact on access, especially in rural areas. The definition is  
still a work in progress. There were two clear and opposing points of view about  
this provision: 
 
• One camp’s view centers on the fact that the provision sends a strong signal to the 
lowest-tier providers that state-served beneficiaries and employees deserve better. 
They note that the state cannot afford to do business with the lowest-tier providers. 
They also point to the provision that allows those providers to reenter into 
contracts with the state the following year, after achieving concrete improvement 
and meeting the prior year’s bar (even if the decile cut-off changes that next year). 
They note that there is an exception for providers deemed necessary to ensure 
access to state beneficiaries. 
 
• The other camp views the policy as misguided for technical and policy reasons. In 
small hospitals, for example, there isn’t always patient sample size to ensure that 
the cost or quality measures are representative of the provider. Worries about 
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 access to care, especially in rural areas, were raised, as were concerns that some 
rural providers would need more time to come up to the standards of urban 
providers and would be unfairly penalized by the policy while they were working 
on improvement. Access concerns are particularly strong for Medicaid, where 
there is already a provider shortage. On the policy side, observers asked: Is 10 
percent the right cut-off? What if the lowest decile falls in the middle of a peer 
group? Some suggested that a better policy would be to collect the data first and 
see how the rankings play out, and before eliminating payment for the lowest 
decile, pay them differentially from the higher performers. 
 
Will the PPG effect change? The law specifies that the state and municipalities 
must use the PPG system to offer plan options that allow consumers to select higher-
value providers. Health plans must offer at least one such option in the small-group and 
individual markets. But whether the market will follow suit, or use a different system (as 
noted above, there is already a great deal of activity in Minnesota) remains to be seen. 
Will it lead to new forms of competition and the payment reform envisioned by the 
Transformation Task Force and many stakeholders? And an even bigger question is 
whether such competition and payment change will yield the cost savings and quality 
improvement desired. 
 
CARE REDESIGN AND PAYMENT REFORM 
“Baskets of Care” 
The 2008 legislation required Minnesota’s Commissioner of Health to establish uniform 
definitions for at least seven “baskets of care” by July 1, 2009, and to establish standard 
quality measurements for them by December 31, 2009. A basket of care is a collection of 
the services that are paid separately under a fee-for-service system, but which are usually 
combined by a provider in delivering a full diagnostic or treatment procedure to a 
patient—for example, all the services needed for knee surgery. (See Appendix C for 
additional information on and an example of the services comprising a basket of care.) 
Under this concept, plans will bundle payments for a set of health care services in ways 
that will create incentives for health care providers to cooperate and innovate on 
approaches to improving health care quality and reducing cost.25 Each basket then is the 
new “product” consumers can purchase, allowing providers, payers, and consumers to 
rethink the organization of health care service delivery. 
 
Bundling payments in this way and publicly disseminating the cost and quality 
information about each provider’s basket is expected to make it easier for consumers to 
find and compare cost information on the baskets of care, but their use in private 
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 insurance is entirely voluntary. Beginning January 1, 2010, health care providers that 
offer these baskets of care will be able to establish their own prices for the baskets. 
Quality information on the baskets will be publicly available beginning July 1, 2010. 
 
The implementation and coordination of baskets of care were not specifically 
defined in legislation because the baskets concept was seen as a market tool to address 
episodes of care and to stimulate competition with an innovative way for providers and 
consumers to think about discrete care packages. With the inclusion in the final 
legislation, some felt that baskets of care would be challenging to implement, absent total 
cost and quality-of-care models. Others felt baskets were an innovative approach for the 
marketplace to spur redesign of care and payment. 
 
The Minnesota Department of Health awarded a contract to the Institute for 
Clinical Systems Improvement (ICSI) to facilitate a steering committee process to define 
the baskets of care. The steering committee held four meetings in 2009, and was led by 
Dr. George Isham, Chief Health Officer and Plan Medical Director, HealthPartners, 
representing the Minnesota Council of Health Plans; and Dr. Douglas L. Wood, 
cardiologist, representing the Mayo Clinic. The committee work groups consisted of 
health care providers, health plan companies, employers, patients, and organizations that 
work to improve health care quality in Minnesota. Their work was to define the specific 
services that are included in the initial baskets, and they completed these definitions. The 
initial baskets of care are: 
 
• Asthma (children)—management of asthma as a chronic disease; 
• Diabetes—without comorbidities (does include hypertension and hyperlipidemia); 
• Low Back Pain—management of acute episode of low back pain; 
• Obstetric Care—prenatal care, uncomplicated vaginal delivery or cesarean section 
delivery; 
• Preventive Care (adults); 
• Preventive Care (children)—well-child care, preventive care, normal newborn 
care; and 
• Total Knee Replacement—inclusive management from preoperative phase 
through rehabilitation phase. 
 
An eighth basket—pre-diabetes—was added by the work group during the year. 
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 Implementation Issues 
Challenges in designing the baskets of care—including balancing the breadth 
of the basket and the resultant heterogeneity on the one hand with simplicity for 
consumers and risk for providers on the other—led to narrower definitions than 
some originally envisioned. While all observers commended the concept as a step in 
moving toward more-defined episodes of care and bundled payment, only a few were 
enthusiastic about the resulting definitions. Questions and problems raised by observers 
have outnumbered kudos so far: 
 
• Chronic care baskets are arguably the most challenging to define, and as a result, 
were noted by some to have been winnowed down in the legislation to the lowest 
common denominator—something stakeholders could agree that, for a particular 
patient population, would be considered appropriate medical care that could then 
be predicted and priced. Because preventive care is fairly specific, with 
established guidelines for periodicity by population, baskets for preventive care 
are relatively easy to delineate. But for a chronic disease like diabetes, boundary 
issues are prevalent. For example, if a consumer is covered for a year of diabetes 
care, is care for a stubbed toe included? Risk-averse providers would naturally 
prefer anything outside their immediate control that might drive up costs be 
excluded, while consumers would find a broader and simpler package easier to 
understand and potentially more desirable. Narrowing the basket and leaving 
ongoing preventive services out, as in the case of the pre-diabetes basket of care, 
provides little incentive or pressure to be proactive in preventing hospitalization. 
 
• One of the biggest barriers for chronic and preventive baskets of care was benefit 
design and the lack of flexibility with payment structures. How to handle 
prescription drugs was another big issue. While it is true that chronic care baskets 
were the most challenging to define, all of them had challenges. 
 
• The definitions of the baskets are built on current clinical practice and do not 
inherently contain incentives for lower-cost treatment. For example, the total knee 
replacement basket starts with the decision that the knee will be replaced, not the 
decision about whether or not it should be. 
 
There are a number of operational issues that still need resolution: 
 
• Who will receive the payments for the baskets—hospitals, physicians, health 
plans, other providers, et al.? Several observers reported volatile discussions over 
 17
 this issue around the total knee replacement basket in particular. Beyond this 
important question are technical issues such as: How will payment systems need 
to change? Who will administer the payments? How will the payments get to 
various providers that do not receive the initial sum? How will the billing office 
determine when to bill a basket and which basket to bill? 
 
• The asthma basket, considered by some to be the most innovative because it 
covers diagnosis through treatment—including drugs and equipment, as well as 
assessment of the home environment—raises the following issue: Physicians are 
currently paid in one way for office visits, pharmacists and drugs are paid in 
another, and environmental assessments generally aren’t covered at all. How will 
the asthma basket work? 
 
• How will complications be handled? For example, with diabetes, will the basket 
cover care for open wounds or sinus care that is more complicated because of the 
diabetes? 
 
• How will the baskets relate to the rest of an individual’s benefit package? How 
will the transition occur from fee-for-service care for individual procedures and 
visits to baskets of care? And from the private employer perspective, if baskets 
are offered in the health plan, should every eligible employee be required to 
participate? How will the two systems mesh? 
 
• How will this system fit with the health care home coordination payment (see 
below)? Several noted that it is important not to pay twice for the same thing, but 
it is not yet clear whether coordination of care is included in the baskets. For some, 
such as diabetes, it seems that care coordination will be part of the basket; 
whereas, for knee replacement, overall care coordination may not be included. 
Coordination of care was identified as one of the core components necessary for 
the success of care delivery in each basket of care. 
 
• The next step in the design process will be to select standard quality measures for 
each basket of care from the standardized statewide set of measures; this has yet 
to be done, although recommendations have been submitted. Observers noted that 
for some of the baskets, valid quality measures do not yet exist. 
 
If we build it, will they come? And will it matter? A key question is whether 
these standard definitions will in fact be used in the market, since their use is entirely 
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 voluntary. The state employee plan is required to consider implementation in their 
benefits, but even they are not mandated to use the definitions. While only time will tell, 
informants varied in their predictions. Some pointed to use of the definitions by the 
members of the Smart Buy Alliance (SBA) as a potential driver. One observer noted that 
the SBA employers and their employees constitute about 50 percent of Minnesota 
patients, which affects many providers. Although adoption is voluntary by each SBA 
participant, if they adopt the baskets of care when purchasing, even with imperfections, 
they could drive change in the market. Others discounted the impact of the SBA entirely 
given that its large-employer participants mostly purchase independently. Some large 
employers are actually proponents of the baskets of care concept, but they have been 
working on different definitions separately. For example, General Mills already offers 
baskets of care to its employees, working with Tony Miller and Carol.com. While these 
have provided a concrete model for the state process and are touted by the company and 
others, the question remains open as to whether the standard state baskets will be 
successful. Several informants, all from the private sector but from very different 
organizational perspectives, commented that there is a strong belief that payment system 
change is necessary, as quickly as is feasible, and if the state system isn’t right, the 
private sector will continue to experiment on its own. 
 
Supporters of the baskets of care concept recognize readily that even if fully 
adopted, baskets are only one small piece of a larger set of strategies to control costs and 
improve value. They are a building block for one type of bundled payment, and if used in 
that way, they can reward quality and efficiency of care over volume. Even when adopted 
by purchasers, they are not designed to save money initially (although for certain 
conditions, savings on hospital admissions over time should occur). Some of those 
involved in developing the baskets believe patient outcomes will improve and have a 
favorable impact on costs over time. Importantly, they are viewed as a means to drive 
change in consumer behavior. Proponents argue that baskets of care are condition-
focused and therefore target more-expensive patients where costs can be saved with 
better care; those who are less supportive note that baskets do nothing at all for consumer 
behavior if the medical conditions are not present. Others find the jury still out on 
consumer behavior but expect that, as with other forms of public reporting, it will be the 
providers who change their practices to compete with each other on price and reputation. 
Most participants in the subcommittees felt baskets of care offer an opportunity to 
enhance patient–provider relationships as well. They are also seen as a way to drive care 
delivery innovation because they provide a new payment model. 
 
Perhaps the most significant potential impact reported is that purchasing on the 
basis of baskets will lead some providers to bid, and some purchasers to buy, on the basis 
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 of a population’s total cost and quality of care. Although “total cost of care” payment 
(with quality measures) was not included in the 2008 reform legislation, it is uniformly 
recognized by the key public and private officials interviewed as the direction Minnesota 
(and others) should be heading; several hold hope that baskets of care will increase public 
and stakeholder support for the change. 
 
Statewide Quality Incentive Payment System 
The 2008 legislation called for a statewide system of quality-based incentive payments to 
health care providers, using a subset of the standardized set of quality measures for health 
care providers. Use by public payers is required, but the payments are intended to be used 
by private health care purchasers as well. The contract with Minnesota Community 
Measurement to develop the measurement and reporting system also included the 
statewide Quality Incentive Payment System. By July 1, 2010, the payment system must 
be implemented for participants in the state employee health plan and enrollees in state 
public insurance programs.26
 
Under this incentive payment system, payment will be based on providers 
achieving target levels of performance or improvement over time, as shown by the 
reported quality measures. MNCM recommended a methodology for the quality incentive 
payment system that rewards providers who attain a defined benchmark performance 
level determined by reviewing historical data, or rewards those providers who reach a 
defined improvement goal designed to close the gap between prior performance and 100 
percent. They also recommended calculating a stretch goal of 4 percent to 5 percent 
average improvement over the previous year, and designing a reward for the top 20 
percent of providers.27,28 In future years, MNCM recommended evaluating additional 
risk-adjustment models and considering a more complex measure-weighting system.29
 
A summary of the selected measures, data collection processes, and reporting 
timelines will be available to providers well in advance of reporting. For the first year of 
the incentive program, Minnesota Community Measurement suggested the following 
initial measures be used to initiate the incentive program: 
 
• Ambulatory Care Measures (collected directly from providers): 
o Comprehensive Diabetes Care (care meeting selected outcome and  
process measures30) 
o Optimal Vascular Care 
o Depression PHQ-9 Six-Month Remission 
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 • Hospital Care Measures (reported by providers and externally validated— 
includes Appropriate Care Measures, a patient-centered all-or-none approach to 
measurement that recognizes when a patient receives all of the evidence-based 
care for which they were eligible, and gives no “credit” when all care is not 
given):31 
o Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI)/Heart Attack 
o Heart Failure 
o Pneumonia 
 
Quality measures to be added in 2010 have already been recommended, and 
MNCM will continue to recommend ambulatory incentive measures on an annual basis. 
 
Implementation Issues 
Because the Quality Incentive Payment System applies to state programs 
only, most informants had little comment on it; rather, they viewed it as another of 
the many pay-for-performance programs already in place in Minnesota. There were 
several comments about the decisions so far: 
 
• With respect to risk adjustment for the payments, one observer noted that the 
method chosen weighed feasibility highly, and the result is probably more than 
most employers and less than most providers would prefer. Employers value a 
mechanism that is simpler and less costly to apply, but providers worry about 
being held accountable for risk not under their control and favor more 
sophisticated and costly methods. 
 
• With respect to whether the payments will support quality improvement or quality 
attainment—a core conceptual issue in pay-for-performance—the current thinking 
is that they will pay for both, a choice that appears to have reasonable support. 
 
• Will the state system align with existing pay-for-performance initiatives? This is 
yet to be known, but from the state perspective, there is a reasonable chance that it 
will, and from all perspectives, this will be a positive step if it occurs. The state is 
already using pay-for-performance through the Bridges to Excellence program; 
the new incentive payments are expected to be slightly different.32 The Buyers 
Health Care Action Group, involving private and public health care purchasers, is 
leading Minnesota’s Bridges to Excellence program. Participating employers 
include 3M, Carlson Companies, General Electric, Health Partners, Honeywell, 
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 Medtronic, Resource Training and Solutions, State of Minnesota Department of 
Employee Relations, Minnesota Department of Human Services, Target 
Corporation, University of Minnesota, and Wells Fargo. Plans are to take the state 
quality measures to the locally governed Bridges to Excellence steering 
committee and work to align the payments, using the state’s large group of 
beneficiaries and employees as the impetus to send a unified signal to providers. 
 
Health Care Homes 
A “health care home,” also called a “medical home,” is an approach to primary care in 
which primary care providers, families, and patients work in partnership to improve 
health outcomes and quality of life for patients. The development of health care homes in 
Minnesota is part of the health reform legislation passed in May 2008. The Minnesota 
program starts with individuals with chronic health conditions and disabilities. The 
legislation directed the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) and the Minnesota 
Department of Human Services (DHS) to develop and implement standards of 
certification for health care homes, develop a certification process, develop a payment 
methodology for publicly insured patients, use a collaborative learning model to spread 
the program, and evaluate outcomes. 
 
The criteria are required to promote use of health care homes to coordinate care 
for people with complex and/or chronic conditions. They were developed over a series of 
meetings with all constituencies in the health care system—patients, providers, health 
plans, purchasers, and community organizations. Multiple informal and formal (rule-
making) structures were used to gain feedback. Input included recommendations by the 
Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement (ICSI) on the outcomes and goals also to be 
used to guide the evaluation of health care homes. 
 
A proposed rule for health care home state certification was adopted by the 
Commissioner of Health in November 2009. It is in the final stage of enactment. The rule 
includes criteria for: 
 
• access and communication; 
• use of registries; 
• care coordination 
• care planning; and 
• practice-level quality improvement. 
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 Mechanisms to allow variances for innovative models and to lower the criteria 
burden for practices achieving high outcomes are included in the rule. The rule also spells 
out the procedures for certification and recertification of health care homes. Minnesota 
worked with experts from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the National 
Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), and the Center for Medical Home 
Improvement in designing standards and criteria. As with many state medical home 
programs, the definition includes some elements of the NCQA standard and adds others; 
it is unique to Minnesota. 
 
The 2008 legislation includes a payment to primary care providers for 
coordination of care consistent with the patient- and family-centered model envisioned in 
the rule. A steering committee and several work groups met seven times in 2008 and 
2009 to develop a system of per-person care coordination payments to certified health 
care homes. Minnesota’s health reform legislation requires DHS, in coordination with 
MDH, to develop the patient complexity–adjusted payment system by January 1, 2010.33
 
The Health Care Homes Outcomes Measurement Work Group is charged with 
developing outcomes measurement implementation strategies and making 
recommendations on how health care homes outcomes measurement can work within the 
broader statewide reporting structure. This work group will receive reports from the 
health care homes team and respond to the progress of outcomes measurement, ongoing 
identification of outcomes, and evaluation of the progress of health care homes 
measurement over time.34 This work group began with three meetings, held in August, 
September, and November 2009. The group will meet quarterly through 2010. 
 
Implementation Issues 
There is widespread support for the concept of better-coordinated care 
through a patient-centered health care home, but the definition of that home 
remains controversial. Observers noted a conceptual difference among supporters; some 
see the health care home as a physician’s practice, while others see it as the set of 
services and supports that facilitate coordination to improve outcomes and lower 
utilization of unnecessary services, such as avoidable hospitalization. The certification 
standards in the proposed rule sets the bar high for practices and anticipates payments 
only when there is real transformation at the practice level, including having a quality 
improvement team that comprises patients and their families. Variation to accommodate 
alternative models is permitted with commissioner approval. The certification standards 
build on known successes in the pediatric community, and emphasize the role of patients 
and families. One informant commented that it is not clear whether the design and 
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 operation will work well for adults with chronic conditions. In addition, whether certified 
homes will have the opportunity or even the requirement to prospectively identify 
patients they care for is under discussion, although favored by the state. 
 
Although the payment system is still under construction, there is already 
debate over the coordination payments, especially where they will come from and 
how they will be applied. The concept of increasing payments for better primary care is 
straightforward, but the details are not: 
 
• A key point of contention is over whether the legislation requires private health 
plans to make care coordination payments for all certified health care homes in 
their networks. It is not surprising that health plans and the state take different 
sides on this issue, and it is under discussion. 
 
• The legislation says that the coordination payment must be financed by the 
savings anticipated from implementing the system of health care homes, and there 
is no additional appropriation to date. Many observers question where the state 
funding for the payments will come from and note that, in particular, Medicaid is 
already a low payer. Aside from the payment level, some question whether there 
will be enough patients in the program from which to generate savings. This is 
partly because of the different readings of the statute noted above with respect to 
whether private plans are required to make the payments. Another reason is that 
the program begins with patients with complex medical conditions or chronic 
conditions. While these are arguably the most expensive, it is unclear whether the 
numbers of patients who will be eligible for the pilots may be too limited to 
realize actual savings in the pilot phase that might otherwise occur with full 
implementation of the program for more patients and conditions. 
 
• As noted earlier, it remains to be worked out how this program will intersect with 
the quality incentive payment system and with payments for baskets of care 
(which are optional). Where is the coordination paid so that it is not done twice? 
This is an example of an implementation issue that still needs to be resolved before 
the program is operational. 
 
• Other details, such as the risk-adjustment mechanism for patient medical and 
nonmedical complexity, are under development. Current thinking for state 
programs is that there will be four levels of payment based on patient complexity; 
these decisions will be made in 2010 before implementation. 
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 CROSS-CUTTING IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
The Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) has primary responsibility for 
implementing many aspects of the reform law, including all of the pieces discussed here 
with the exception of the health care homes, which is jointly implemented by MDH and 
the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS). Given the law’s explicit 
commitment to a strong public/private partnership, and with a practical dose of capacity 
issues for the tight implementation timeframe, MDH used a Request for Proposal (RFP) 
process to work with private sector organizations with specific expertise in the various 
areas of the bill. In this way MDH would provide coordination and oversight, but the 
private sector would do much of the substantive work. In the first year, 12 RFPs were 
issued and contracts were awarded to 20 organizations and individuals.35
 
Although each one expressed high respect for the state staff running the process, 
many private sector informants expressed concern that different reforms were under 
development in separate processes led by separate organizations on different time frames. 
The concerns were partially about the lack of an apparent road map to bring the pieces 
together, although it was noted that the law itself is not one cohesive plan. There were 
also concerns about how the individual decisions, measures, and payments would work 
and whether the things measured and the methods of payment were different in each 
program, they would then work at cross purposes and undermine the goals. As noted 
earlier, it is unclear how payments for health care homes will interact with payments for 
baskets of care or the statewide quality incentive payment system. Another example cited 
by the key informants is that the provider peer grouping work group that defined the PPG 
methodology recommended the key quality measures to be used, but a separate group is 
developing the standardized statewide set of quality measures, and a third is developing 
the health care home quality measures. 
 
Even as the individual implementation issues are resolved, separately or together, 
several informants lamented that because so much is occurring simultaneously, it will be 
difficult to attribute which reform or set of reforms affect future performance. It is 
unlikely that any one action will be the key; in most cases it will be some set, but the 
composition of that set will vary depending on the different starting points of the different 
providers. Will there be missed learning opportunities about what specifically led to 
improved quality scores for a particular practice site? Perhaps, say others, but they 
perceive the more important question to be whether a voluntary approach in the private 
sector to payment reform—albeit with uniform data and transparency—will result in a 
critical mass adopting the reforms. They differ on predictions about whether or not this 
will happen. Without it, however, all agree that the system transformation sought will  
not occur. 
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 Finally, as Exhibit 3 illustrates, even in Minnesota’s fairly consolidated market, 
no payer has influence over even a majority of the dollars. While Medicare is only 16 
percent of spending (less than in some other states), the other payers have similar 
minority segments; private insurance is divided among the different plans, including state 
employees. Observers commented that Medicare’s participation would be extremely 
desirable even more for its national leadership than its market share. Still, having the rest 
of the market adopt the voluntary reforms could go a long way if it occurs in a 
coordinated fashion. 
 
Exhibit 3. Shares of Minnesota Health Care Spending by Payer, 2007
Source: Minnesota Health Care Spending in 2007, Issue Brief (Health Economics Program, Nov. 2009), 
available at: http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/hpsc/hep/publications/costs/healthspending2007.pdf.
Medicare
16%
Medicaid
18%
Other public
7%
Private health insurance
43%
Out-of-pocket
13%
Other private
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LESSONS FROM MINNESOTA 
Even at this early stage, Minnesota’s experience to date can provide some useful lessons 
for other states, and even for federal and state officials charged with implementing the 
recently enacted health reform legislation. The key informants for this study had a great 
deal to say about the process of getting the legislation passed, the content of the package, 
its potential impact, and its replicability elsewhere (summarized below). Not surprisingly, 
different stakeholders offered different perspectives on what matters most, as well as the 
degree of agreement or contention that existed in passing the law and exists now in its 
implementation. Yet taken together, there was a fair amount of consensus about these 
lessons. We stress, however, that this is an unfinished story: because the implementation 
is still a work in progress, there is more that can be said now about the passage of reforms 
than about their results. And as such, there are still more questions than answers. 
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 PASSING REFORM 
 
• Leadership, leadership, leadership. The overarching lesson in passing 
Minnesota’s reforms is a familiar cry, but its importance cannot be 
overemphasized: leadership was critical at every stage, and still is. Minnesota’s 
leadership came in many forms, and each was essential to the final package. 
There was leadership from state officials—first in terms of developing the 
recommendations (through the Transformation Task Force [TTF] and in the 
Legislative Commission on Health Care Access [LCHA]) and then in terms of 
passing the bill. But equally crucial were the private sector leaders, including 
business, integrated delivery systems, health plans, and the leaders of the hospital 
and medical associations. For the various provider groups, the rank-and-file 
general membership did not readily follow the group’s official position put forth 
by its leaders, but leadership prevailed. 
 
• System reform is a bipartisan issue, especially when framed as controlling 
costs and improving value. With a Democratic legislature and a Republican 
governor, the decision to focus on cost control before access was critical to the 
bill’s passage. Unlike Massachusetts, which did the opposite, the joint decision of 
the Senate and House to address costs first and access second was heralded by 
several as a key strategic move in Minnesota. The debated provisions, many of 
which ultimately passed, were derived from two bipartisan processes (the TTF 
and the LCHA) that came up with similar recommendations. Observers 
commented that both the legislature and the governor agreed that they could share 
credit for the bill, although there was certainly partisan posturing in the throes of 
the debate. 
 
• Articulation and rearticulation of clear goals for reform throughout the 
process motivates action—and compromise when necessary. Early in the 
reform implementation process, all participants agreed to the triple aim of 
improving the health of the population, enhancing the patient experience of care 
(including quality, access, and reliability), and reducing (or at least controlling) 
the per capita cost of care.36 Stakeholders were concerned that legislation might 
not pass, so the state applied to participate in the State Quality Improvement 
Institute37 as a back-up plan. When legislation did pass, the state used its 
participation in the Institute to focus on what goals it wanted to accomplish with 
the legislation and to articulate them clearly and persuasively. Several informants 
emphasized the importance of the goal as a motivator at various tough times. In 
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 addition, the TTF’s goal of reducing health care spending by 20 percent was 
reportedly a key driver of the specific payment reforms that were deliberated 
(including the total cost and quality-of-care provision that did not pass). Finally, 
including population health in the legislation was important on a practical level. 
By including the statewide health improvement plan in the cost estimates for the 
bill, which showed savings over time from public health measures, the plan was 
not only included but its upfront investment was funded for two years. 
 
• Good data on variation in quality and cost coupled with concrete personal 
stories were instrumental in building a shared sense that such variation is 
unacceptable and that incentives have to be changed. Multiple informants 
recalled specific instances of testimony presented that resonated with legislators 
and other stakeholders. For example, data showing that most providers give 
optimal diabetes care for only 50 percent of their patients, and some providers do 
not give optimal diabetes care for any of their patients, generated outrage and 
built support for payment and transparency reforms. Another example was a 
report on obesity in Minnesota that helped legislators understand that money was 
being spent without a resulting improvement in health. And in the two years 
leading up to the legislation’s passage, new research became available which 
showed that there are interventions that can improve care for people with chronic 
illness, but financial incentives worked against their adoption. Legislators began 
to understand that with reform, it is possible to improve health and health care and 
save money at the same time. 
 
• The shared experience of a long-standing public–private partnership and 
multiple reform discussions, coupled with a shared sense that the status quo 
is untenable, moves mountains, or at least hills. The years of stakeholder 
engagement and experience through the Minnesota Medical Home Learning 
Collaborative, Smart Buy Alliance, ICSI, Minnesota Community Measurement, 
and private sector experience such as the Buyers Health Care Action Group—as 
well as multiple and improving iterations of pay-for-performance—were explicit 
precursors to the 2008 law. In addition, the agreements reached in developing 
various comprehensive reform plans through processes, such as the Minnesota 
Medical Association’s health reform task force, the TTF, and the LCHA, meant 
that in some respects the landmark legislation was the next logical step in a 
continuous process. When asked about the key decisions made in passing the 
2008 law, one observer noted that it was hard to say because the process was 
evolutionary. Many involved in these efforts were not only from the same 
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 organizations over time, but they were the same individuals, allowing 
relationships and shared respect to grow even when points of view differed. 
 
• “Level 3” or “total cost of care” payment was introduced too late in the 
process to win passage; its inclusion in the package set the stage for a next 
round. The TTF included total cost of care (and quality) payment prominently in 
its recommendations. It was introduced into the legislation, but unlike some of the 
reforms, there was no real vetting of the total cost of care idea before the 
legislative session. Multiple observers noted that there was no time to obtain the 
support of the trade groups (especially the hospital and medical associations) or 
the public. Others reported that the language in the final bill was neither well 
crafted nor well understood. For example, although the intention of the reform 
was to create an innovative total accountability option for organizations, it was 
interpreted as individual physician capitation, which raised immediate concern 
and opposition. Many reported, however, that there has been significant progress 
since the 2008 debate, including progress on developmental models for 
appropriate risk-/gain-sharing and accountable care organizations. Organizations 
opposed at the time of passage, including some major provider systems, are 
actively seeking such payment in their contracts voluntarily. 
 
CONTENT OF REFORM PACKAGE 
 
• Although Minnesota’s payment and transparency reforms did not go as far 
as some proponents wanted, the elements that did pass in 2008 are critical 
building blocks for future reforms. The all-payer data collection and the 
standardized set of quality measures clearly support payment that rewards value 
over volume. The definitions of baskets of care must be coupled with benefit 
package incentives for measurable impact, but even with that limitation, the 
implementation process has helped to build broader understanding among 
stakeholders about the benefits of moving to more bundled payment, and also 
helped to develop some practical illustrations and raise issues. No matter what the 
next evolution is in Minnesota’s health care reform, the implementation of the 
2008 legislation has focused on care coordination, episodes of care, and value-
based payments as important attributes. 
 
• The reform package includes elements and a process that will align 
reporting, analysis, and payment pilots already under way, potentially 
leading to a greater overall impact. Observers commented that the community-
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 wide database will be valuable for everyone. Although most plans already were 
conducting analyses like the provider peer grouping system, they were doing so 
with different methods and for their own patients only. The combined data will be 
more robust and send a consistent message. As subsets of the purchasing 
population move to use the system, there should be increasing numbers of 
providers with increasing portions of their patients affected by efforts to improve 
what is being measured. 
 
• An imperfect package is far preferable to a “do nothing” alternative, but 
questions remain as to whether it will actually work as a package. To be sure, 
there are questions about how the various components will fit together (e.g., the 
payments for health care homes and baskets of care), and several informants 
decried the lack of a road map for doing so. Several stakeholders commented that 
as a result, compliance will increase complexity rather than decrease it. But doing 
nothing was not acceptable from any perspective. 
 
• There are mixed views about the ambitious timetable, but the positive aspects 
appear to outweigh the negative. The ambitious implementation timetable 
continues the public–private dialogue and momentum that led to the legislation’s 
passage. Perhaps even more important is that there are numerous, difficult choices 
left to the implementation phase; having a shorter timeframe to debate them can 
be useful for taking action rather than drawing out the discussion. Some 
legislators viewed the time frame as a way to save money earlier rather than later, 
although several observers worried that those expectations are unrealistic. Still, 
most agreed that because many concepts are untested, it is critical to get pilots in 
place as soon as possible to learn what does and does not work. Critics noted that 
the short time table resulted in a missed opportunity to simplify the system and 
ensure that the package works better as a whole. 
 
POTENTIAL IMPACT 
 
• Despite the significant public–private and private–private collaboration 
already in place in Minnesota, the legislation has the potential for significant 
acceleration of efforts that otherwise would take much longer. In addition to 
establishing a more coherent environment for quality measurement and payment 
so that various players will use the same methods, the legislation provides 
impetus and resources to expedite improvement. A few observers pointed to the 
danger that the work could instead be slowed or get bogged down in political 
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 fighting, but the stakes are high enough to engender cautious optimism. In 
addition, the state involvement and funding brings all insurance markets except 
Medicare to the table, and this was generally seen as positive by the private 
sector. Many further commented that the law gives the public–private and 
private–private partnerships sanction and support. 
 
• To transform the system, a majority of stakeholders must be affected. Is the 
legislation, with voluntary adoption of reforms by the private sector, 
sufficient for real reform? There was clear agreement that for significant impact, 
payment and transparency reforms must be pervasive. It remains to be seen 
whether reforms like paying for baskets of care will be widely adopted without a 
mandate on private payers to use them. Some observers commented that if the 
participants in the Smart Buy Alliance were to use the baskets, there would be 
significant impact, but others noted that large-employer support for that coalition 
doesn’t translate into purchasing jointly. 
 
• Where is Medicare? Without exception, informants recognized that without 
Medicare, Minnesota’s reforms will not affect 16 percent of health care dollars. 
There was clear interest in getting Medicare data for the all-payer system, but the 
interest went quite a bit further. One observer called the recent announcement by 
the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish Medicare’s 
participation in multipayer medical home demonstrations a “huge step,” but it was 
widely recognized that Medicare’s participation in the rest of Minnesota’s reforms 
would truly increase the chances of success in transforming the delivery system. 
The new health reform legislation includes provisions for pilot initiatives that 
would include Medicare; Minnesota appears poised to be an early adopter. 
 
A MODEL TO REPLICATE? 
As noted throughout this report, Minnesota’s reforms are a work in progress. By passing 
their reforms first, Minnesota’s ability to overcome many political and policy challenges 
in order to enact the legislation can serve as a model for other states. Under the new 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, states have numerous opportunities 
to pilot payment reform and transparency initiatives in partnership with the federal 
government. As other states consider similar activities, they can understand better how 
similar reforms would affect key stakeholders and devise strategies to overcome political 
and technical issues. 
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 • Many of the elements in Minnesota’s reforms could be replicated in other 
states, although Minnesota’s prior voluntary experience provided a 
significant boost to adoption and, now, to implementation. The data collection 
and reporting reforms were thought by all to be readily adoptable by other states. 
This was also true for the care redesign and payment reforms, but here observers 
noted that the form of bundled payment might look different in markets with other 
types of health plans and a lesser degree of delivery-system integration. Given 
that there is still much to learn about what works best, innovators in Minnesota 
would welcome the opportunity to see different models in operation while they 
implement their own. 
 
• While national standards for quality measurement are helpful, payment 
reform and transparency need to be implemented in different ways at the 
state or local level. The implementation process—including the accomplishments 
to date and the challenges remaining—points to the clear role for state or local 
implementation. Examples abound of the desirability of local innovation within a 
standard framework, from the standardized statewide quality measures system, 
the all-payer database, and the need to work with providers to get useful data, to 
the provider peer grouping system and the challenges to seeking improvement 
while preserving access, to the questions about how to support real primary care 
transformation in the health care home. For example, local providers often want 
measures that they believe are more clinically meaningful than national metrics. 
As long as the results of innovation are measured and reported, the best means to 
improvement can be learned and taught to others. 
 
• Payment and transparency reforms require an upfront investment; many 
states are unlikely to be in Minnesota’s fiscal position to fund them. While 
observers expect the savings to greatly exceed the investment, Minnesota’s 
legislation did include a $12 million expenditure to implement the transparency 
and payment reforms, a sum made possible by the state’s Health Care Access 
Fund. Few states have such a dedicated source of funding. In addition, the 
political will to make an investment for future savings doesn’t come readily, 
although observers noted that the climate is perhaps more ripe for such 
discussions given the passage of national health reform legislation. 
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 CONCLUSION 
Minnesota’s 2008 health reform legislation did not go as far on payment reform as some 
proponents had wanted, but still puts in place important reforms to change payment 
mechanisms and care delivery through data collection and reporting, as well as through 
designing payments to encourage coordination and efficient delivery. Given all the 
previous activity in the state, the law was perhaps more evolutionary than revolutionary, 
but the elements needed for real transformation are all there. Notably, there is significant 
commitment to transformation from every stakeholder group, and all of them will be fully 
involved with implementation. 
 
Whether the voluntary nature of some of the reforms’ adoption will lead to the 
critical mass of support envisioned—and needed—remains to be seen, but the evident 
public and private leadership leaves us cautiously optimistic. Were Medicare to join the 
state’s efforts, the chances for success would improve. 
 
Currently, the accountable care organization concept has a great deal of traction in 
the state, with much interest in some kind of better-organized system that can accept 
bundled payment. The state’s reforms are important building blocks for this concept, and 
Minnesota will be an excellent testing ground. 
 
Finally, this report illustrates that passing legislation is only a first step toward 
health system reform. It points to the value of assessing early content and process lessons, 
both to improve what is under way locally and to inform other states seeking to solve the 
same difficult problems. As Minnesota learns, so will the nation. 
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 APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON KEY ORGANIZATIONS 
AND HEALTH REFORM EFFORTS 
 
Patient Choice Health Care Model (as evolved from the Buyers Health Care Action 
Group, BHCAG) http://www.patientchoicehealthcare.com 
The Patient Choice Health Care model evolved out of the activities of the Buyer’s Health 
Care Action Group (BHCAG). BHCAG was created by business leaders in 1988 to 
address escalating health care costs in Minnesota by using value-based purchasing 
predicated on principles that improve health care quality, promote provider competition 
in the health care market, create efficiencies in health care delivery, and enhance 
consumer choice and knowledge.38 The model was developed to use market forces to 
encourage consumer demand for value, which spurs providers to improve quality and 
manage total costs.39 A unique feature of this approach was to drive competition among 
providers on cost and quality rather than competition among health plans and payments 
were designed to address the “total cost of care.”40
 
The Patient Choice Health Care model uses global payment incentives in a 
fashion distinct from traditional capitation, in an attempt to prevent providers from 
gaming the system to maximize their global payment. Under total cost of care, providers 
are encouraged to take responsibility for the total population cost while working with 
multiple plan designs and provider structures. Key to this development is encouraging 
providers to organize into multispecialty systems (virtually or vertically integrated) to 
create economies of structure that facilitate provider groups developing and bidding on 
total cost of care. Another key to this approach is transparency of information on provider 
performance, cost, and quality, by organizing provider bids into a tiered system that 
allows consumers to make their health care choices based on relative cost and quality. 
The expectation is that as consumers select providers based on value, the health care market 
as a whole will improve performance and quality to attract these value-conscious consumers. 
 
In 1997, BHCAG used this concept to develop the nation’s first tiered health care 
delivery model, Choice Plus, designed to promote competition among provider groups 
though consumer choice: Choice Plus faced some growth challenges, including the 
withdrawal of two of its largest employer members from BHCAG. In response, BHCAG 
formed the for-profit Patient Choice Health Care, Inc., in 2000 to assume management of 
the Choice Plus program (now the Patient Choice Care System Program) and to build on 
its success. Medica acquired the Minnesota and Dakota operations of Patient Choice in 
the spring of 2004. Operating as a business segment within Medica, Patient Choice 
continues to develop programs that lead the market toward value-based health care 
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 purchasing—differentiating provider performance and giving consumers the information 
they need to evaluate cost and quality.41
 
Minnesota Community Measurement (MNCM) http://www.mncm.org
The idea behind Minnesota Community Measurement was developed in 2000 by medical 
directors of three of Minnesota’s largest health plans, who were also members of the 
Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement (ICSI). Their impetus was to improve the 
quality of care in Minnesota by developing joint performance reports at the medical 
group level by developing and using standard measurement and transparent reporting, 
with the additional aims of reducing system costs and improving value. They were 
rapidly joined by other health plans and the Minnesota Medical Association, all of whom 
participate by supplying data and paying membership fees. MNCM is also supported 
through grants from organizations such as the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
Aligning Forces for Quality project. 
 
By 2003, Minnesota Community Measurement released its first performance 
report on diabetes care, and in 2004 released its first report on medical group 
performance measures. By 2008, 67 participating medical groups, representing over 350 
sites, directly submitted data on two measures. Also in 2008, MNCM released its first 
annual disparities report using data derived from health plan claims and medical records. 
MNCM data are used to support the Bridges to Excellence Pay for Performance program. 
This partnership has promoted measure alignment among Minnesota health plans. 
 
In addition to publishing and disseminating condition-specific performance 
reports to participating clinics, Minnesota Community Measurement disseminates health 
scores at the clinic level via its Web site, www.mnhealthscores.org. Data are provided by 
Minnesota health plans as well as submitted directly by more than 300 medical clinics 
statewide, and are organized by condition—such as diabetes, depression, vascular 
disease—as well as by patient experience and by use of health information technology. 
Users can search the Web site by location, clinic name, or health condition. MNCM also 
supports the D5 for Diabetes project. This project and Web site, www.thed5.org, are 
targeted to diabetes patients to encourage them and their caregivers to learn about and 
achieve the D5, a set of five treatment goals that, when achieved, reduce the risk of heart 
attack or stroke. The Web site also reports Minnesota Community Measurement’s clinic 
results for this diabetes measure. MNCM is the contractor with the state for developing 
quality measures for the 2008 legislative reforms. 
 
 
 36
 The Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement (ICSI) http://www.icsi.org
The Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement is a nonprofit regional health care 
collaborative that develops and disseminates evidence-based clinical guidelines for the 
prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and management of numerous diseases and health 
conditions, in an effort to improve the quality and value of health care in Minnesota. ICSI 
was started in 1993 by HealthPartners, Mayo Clinic, and Park Nicollet Health Services. 
In 2001, four more large health plans joined HealthPartners as ICSI sponsors. Health plan 
sponsors provide a portion of ICSI’s funding. Currently ICSI has seven sponsors, 57 
medical groups participate, and it represents more than 85 percent of physicians in 
Minnesota (more than 9,000 individual providers). 
 
Because of ICSI’s efforts, Minnesota became the first state in the nation where 
medical care was built around the systematic use of science-based best medical practices 
developed by physicians and sponsored by major health plans. Its health care guidelines 
are widely recognized as the standard of practice in Minnesota and beyond. ICSI’s 
collaborative work has become the model for other U.S. regional care improvement 
collaboratives. As the leading collaborative, ICSI has recently expanded the scope of its 
work to help lead the transformation of Minnesota’s health care system. 
 
ICSI tackled major health issues like diabetes across all member organizations. It 
recently broadened its support for improvement to address member organizational 
infrastructure and culture. One current undertaking involves developing a diagnostic 
imaging project that saved an estimated 20 lives through reduced exposure to 
unnecessary radiation in a year-long pilot project and $50 million in health care costs in 
Minnesota in 2010 by allowing providers to use, as an option to health plan prior 
notification, appropriateness criteria to order high-technology diagnostic imaging scans at 
the point of care. The DIAMOND (Depression Improvement Across Minnesota, Offering 
a New Direction) initiative is a project to improve treatment for depression by changing 
the way care is delivered, requiring medical groups and health plans to collaboratively 
develop new care practice and payment models. In addition, ICSI is working on two 
fundamental elements of Minnesota’s 2008 health care reform legislation: 1) developing 
a sustainable model for health care homes and facilitating a Minnesota Department of 
Health project to define eight baskets of care meant to help consumers compare the value 
of services offered by different providers, and 2) educating providers on baskets of care. 
 
Smart Buy Alliance (SBA) www.smartbuyalliance.com
The Smart Buy Alliance formed in 2004 out of a coalition of public and private health 
care purchasers, of which the Buyer’s Health Care Action Group (BHCAG) was a key 
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 organizer. The goal of the coalition was to grow large enough to have the combined 
market power to demand quality and value from health plans and medical providers, and 
no longer simply purchase health care based on cost.42 The inclusion of large state health 
purchasers such as the Department of Employee Relations (DOER), Minnesota’s 
employee benefit agency, and the Department of Human Services, which oversees 
Minnesota Medicaid, allowed the purchaser coalition to represent about three-fifths of 
Minnesota’s population, giving it large influence in the health care market. 
 
The Smart Buy Alliance developed a set of common principles to guide its 
activities: to identify and reward provider quality, to adopt uniform measures of quality, 
to empower consumers with easy access to information, and to accelerate the use of 
health information technology. The Smart Buy Alliance Web site, 
www.smartbuyalliance.com, provides consumers with information to compare the cost 
and quality of physicians and medical groups, hospitals, health plans, nursing homes, and 
home health care, as well as online tools to calculate the cost of health care. It also 
provides links to the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) Web site, which is 
designed to help consumers and health care providers learn more about evidence-based 
medicine, demonstrated best practices, and patient safety. 
 
The Alliance promotes the adoption and use of tools such as: the Bridges to 
Excellence (BTE) pay-for-performance model, which in Minnesota uses standardized 
ICSI clinical measures and data collected by Minnesota Community Measurement; the 
QCare (Quality Care and Reward Excellence) plan to include incentives in health care 
contracts to improve reporting of cost and quality information (among other 
improvements and accountability measures); eValue8, a Web-based tool that allows 
health care purchasers to compare health plans; and the Patient Advocacy Best in Class 
Program (PA-BIC), a voluntary evaluation of provider programs addressing high-cost 
specialty care. 
 
Minnesota Medical Association Health Care Reform Task Force and  
Healthy Minnesota 
In 2004 the Minnesota Medical Association (MMA) created a Health Care Reform Task 
Force to develop a plan for health reform. The goal of the task force was to recommend 
bold and fundamental changes for Minnesota’s system of health care. The 21-member 
task force met 11 times during a nine-month period and published its recommendations  
in 2005 as the Physicians' Plan for a Healthy Minnesota.43 This document outlined a 
long-term goal of achieving universal coverage by requiring citizens to have insurance, 
and the following short-term goals to transform Minnesota’s health care system to make 
this possible: 
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 • Advocate for stronger public health policies and systems; 
• Help physicians deliver evidence-based care; 
• Support a medical home for every Minnesotan through changes in administrative 
and payment policies; 
• Support efforts to improve care delivery and payment for patients with chronic 
and complex conditions; 
• Advocate for including behavioral health care as part of basic medical benefits; 
• Support an information infrastructure that would allow collection, reporting, and 
dissemination of the information needed to measure and improve quality and help 
patients make choices about cost and quality; 
• Advocate for reductions in administrative complexity; 
• Support a $1 per pack increase in the tobacco tax to help preserve Minnesota’s 
health care programs and move toward universal insurance coverage; 
• Advocate for a statewide ban on smoking in bars and restaurants; and 
• Explore legislative options regarding specific reforms such as an individual 
insurance requirement, an essential benefit set, and insurance market reform. 
 
The MMA’s reform plan served as the starting point for the partnership, Healthy 
Minnesota: A Partnership for Reform,44 brought together by the MMA in March 2006. 
Healthy Minnesota consisted of an independent group of influential leaders in health care, 
business, state government, labor, education, and consumer advocacy with a goal to 
recommend and implement strategies for health care reform. Healthy Minnesota 
proposed health reform legislation that was considered but did not pass in 2007.45 The 
goal of this legislation was for the state to achieve universal coverage by 2011. Interim 
steps toward that goal included: 
 
• Requiring every Minnesotan to have health insurance; 
• Requiring health plans to offer insurance for the minimum benefit set to all 
applicants; 
• Reforming the payment system by creating medical home pilot projects that 
coordinate care; and 
• Strengthening the public health system. 
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 That 2007 legislation and the relationships developed by the Healthy Minnesota 
Partnership for Reform laid the groundwork for the development of the Legislative 
Commission on Health Care Access, the Health Care Transformation Task Force, and 
ultimately, passage of the 2008 reform bill.46
 
Health Care Transformation Task Force 
The Health Care Transformation Task Force was created in 2007 by the Minnesota 
legislature, which required the governor to convene a task force to develop an action plan 
to improve affordability, access, quality of health care, and the health status of 
Minnesotans. The task force had 13 members appointed by the governor, four members 
appointed by the legislature, and one ex officio member. 
 
The Task Force was charged to: 
 
• Reduce health care expenditures by 20 percent by January 2011, and limit the rate 
of growth in health care spending to no greater than the percentage increase in the 
Consumer Price Index plus two percentage points each year thereafter; 
• Increase affordable health coverage options for all Minnesotans and ensure all 
Minnesotans will have health coverage by January 2011; 
• Improve the quality and safety of health care and reduce racial and ethnic 
disparities in access and quality; 
• Improve the health status of Minnesotans and reduce the rate of preventable 
chronic illness; 
• Propose changes to state health care purchasing and payment strategies that 
promote higher-quality, lower-cost health care; 
• Promote the appropriate and cost-effective investment in new facilities, 
technologies, and drugs; 
• Create options for serving small employers and their employees, and self-
employed individuals; and 
• Reduce administrative costs. 
 
The Health Care Transformation Task Force report, issued in January 2008, 
recommended transforming health care in Minnesota by addressing five core principles:47
 
• Improving the health of Minnesota’s population (individual wellness); 
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 • Improving quality, cost, and patient-centeredness using both collaboration and 
competition (improving system quality); 
• Restructuring the health care payment system to support and encourage evidence-
based, high-value health care (payment reform); 
• Reducing the overall size of the health care system (reduce overuse of health care, 
new technologies, and administrative costs); and 
• Providing necessary health care to all Minnesotans at an affordable cost (change 
function of individual and small-group insurance market and develop a health 
insurance exchange). 
 
The Task Force recommended that the payment system hold providers 
accountable for quality, efficiency, care coordination, and the total cost of care. They felt 
that this could be best achieved in three stages. Large integrated practices systems could 
be ready to participate in Level 3; others might only be ready for Level 1. There was the 
expectation that hospitals, physicians, clinics, and other providers would move to Level 3 
by 2012. 
 
Level 1 involved making payments to providers dependent upon on the quality 
and efficiency of care provided. Providers that would meet targets for improvement 
would be eligible for quality/efficiency-based payments. Specific indicators and measures 
of quality and efficiency were recommended based on the provider’s setting. The 
indicators measured provider outcomes rather than process. 
 
Level 2 involved providers taking on greater responsibility for care coordination, 
particularly for patients with chronic conditions. Providers serving as a medical home or 
health care home would receive care management fees for monitoring and managing care. 
Payments would be adjusted for the complexity of the patients served. Initially, payments 
based on process would be phased out in replacement of cost and quality results. 
Providers would need to have care management systems in place to be eligible to receive 
the additional payment. The additional care management fee creates an additional 
payment on top of the total cost of care. This cost would be offset by lower utilization of 
acute care services. 
 
Level 3 involved providers and care systems assuming responsibility for the total 
cost of care as well as the quality of care provided for patients. Providers would not be 
responsible for higher costs of care that result from caring for sicker people, not 
preventable through the actions of the provider. Providers and care systems would submit 
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 bids to health plans and other purchasers to provide care under a standardized benefit. 
The total cost of care would include anything under the standard benefit, but nothing 
outside the benefit set. Bids would be based on value, not just cost, and must decrease 
costs over current levels. A mechanism for soliciting and accepting bids would ensure 
that bids from different providers could be compared by consumers based on relative 
value. Payments to providers for the cost of care would be risk/complexity adjusted based 
on the health and special needs of the population they manage. Providers would be 
rewarded for keeping patients healthy. Level 3 is different than a traditional capitation 
system, as providers would be responsible for managing the cost of care, but would be 
paid additional monies for patients with complex health needs. 
 
Legislative Commission on Health Care Access 
The Legislative Commission on Health Care Access was established in 1992, and in 2007 
was required by the Minnesota legislature to convene a task force to make 
recommendations to the legislature on how to achieve the goal of universal health 
coverage. The legislature’s goal was to ensure that all Minnesota residents have access to 
affordable health care by January 1, 2011. 
 
Membership of the commission consists of five members of the Senate and five 
members of the House of Representatives. Working groups of stakeholders were formed 
by the commission to address the following areas: 
 
• public health 
• insurance market reform 
• cost containment 
• health care for long-term care workers 
• single-payer health care, and 
• bridging the health care continuum. 
 
Each working group was composed of House and Senate members of both parties, 
as well as representatives of health plans, health care providers, labor unions, counties, 
employers and other organizations, and consumers. The working groups met over several 
months, resulting in each working group developing a prioritized list of recommendations 
that was presented to the commission. The commission then reviewed the resulting 
recommendations and developed and adopted the recommendations contained in the final 
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 report, “Recommendations Submitted to the Minnesota State Legislature,” which the 
committee submitted in February 2008. 
 
The commission developed detailed recommendations that were grouped into the 
following sections: 
 
• Public Health—Develop and implement a comprehensive health promotion 
program, including a statewide educational curriculum on health, nutrition, and 
physical education, and monitor and report childhood obesity using body mass 
index (BMI) measures. 
• Health Care Homes—Establish health care homes and require participation of all 
state health care program enrollees, integrate pharmacy with primary care, and 
encourage changes in scope of practice and licensure necessary to implement the 
health care home model. 
• Affordability—Establish a health insurance exchange, require employers to 
establish section 125 plans, provide premium subsidies, and raise the 
MinnesotaCare income limit. 
• Continuity of Care—Eliminate the MinnesotaCare four-month uninsured 
requirement and streamline enrollment. 
• Health Insurance Reform—Establish statewide health improvement and outcome 
measurement and reporting goals, and adopt a modified community rating system 
in health insurance, among other recommendations. 
• Cost Recapturing Mechanisms—Establish a savings recapture assessment, increasing 
tobacco fees, creating a community benefit pool, and aggressively negotiating 
growth limits and cost controls in managed care contracts with health plans. 
• New Cost Containment Initiatives—Develop an evidence-based benefit set, an 
evaluation process for new procedures, medications, and technologies, and a 
midlevel dental practitioner to work with licensed dentists. 
• Health Care for Long-Term Care Workers—Determine the cost of a future rate 
increase to long-term care employers that would be dedicated to the purchase of 
employee health insurance. 
• Universal Coverage—Continue to study the option of the state transitioning to a 
single-payer style health care delivery system, and review existing occupational 
licensure requirements and the scope of practice identify situations in which 
health care professionals could provide an expanded level of care. 
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 • Payment Reform—Implement Payment Reform Levels 1 and 2, as developed by 
the Transformation Task Force. 
• Universal Coverage—Require all Minnesota residents to have health coverage, a 
requirement triggered if a recommended phase-in schedule of interim goals for 
fiscal years 2009–2013 is not met. 
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 APPENDIX C. AN EXAMPLE OF BASKETS OF CARE 
 
Total Knee Replacement Basket of Care 
 
The components of the Total Knee Replacement1 basket of care are highlighted below. 
 
Description Timeframe / Frequency 
Preoperative Phase:2 
• Pre-surgery education including: 
– Procedure education 
– Physical therapy education & exercises 
– Deep vein thrombosis prophylaxis 
(mechanical & chemical) 
– Nutrition discussion (referral if indicated) 
– Smoking identification (referral if indicated) 
• Case management for planning post-hospital discharge3 
Prior to procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prior to procedure 
Operative / Acute Care Phase: 
• Anesthesia services / Operating room services 
• Professional fees4 
• Knee prosthesis5 
• Imaging 
 
As required for surgical procedure 
As required for care within the basket 
Per clinical indications 
Minimum of 1 set postoperative films and other imaging  
as clinically indicated 
• Laboratory 
– Postoperative hemoglobin and other laboratory 
studies as indicated 
Per clinical indications 
• Deep vein thrombosis prophylaxis6 
– Mechanical compression devices 
– Chemical (anticoagulation medications) 
– Laboratory tests as indicated; international 
normalized ratio (INR) if on Coumadin 
• Post-procedure facility services (hospital days, 
transitional care unit), home health, alternative sites7 
• Medications8 
– Prophylactic antibiotics 
– Continuation of home medications during the 
inpatient stay 
• Pain management9 
• Physical therapy 
• Durable medical equipment 
Per clinical indications 
 
 
 
 
Per patient requirements 
 
Per clinical indications 
 
 
 
Per patient requirements 
Per patient requirements 
Per patient requirements 
• Occupational therapy (if indicated for discharge to home)
• Medicine consultation10 
– Follow-up visits as needed 
• Case management (inpatient)11 
Per patient requirements 
Per clinical indications 
 
Per patient requirements 
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 Description Timeframe / Frequency 
Post-Hospital Phase—90 days after procedure 
• Postoperative follow-up surgical visits12 
• Physical therapy13 
 
Per clinical indications 
Per patient requirements 
• Durable medical equipment Per patient requirements 
• Occupational therapy (if indicated for discharge) Per patient requirements 
• Deep vein prophylaxis 
– Mechanical compression devices 
– Chemical (anticoagulation medications) 
– Laboratory tests as indicated; international 
normalized ratio (INR) if on Coumadin 
• Pain management 
• Imaging14 
• Home health 
• Transitional care unit15 
• Inpatient care for readmission within 90 days after 
procedure resulting from complications related to the 
surgical site, assuming care delivered by the same 
provider group 
Per clinical indications 
 
 
 
 
Per patient requirements 
1 plain film of knee postoperatively 
Per patient requirements 
Per patient requirements 
Per clinical indications 
1 Scope: The subcommittee, as part of this explorative step in creating a TKR basket, elected to maintain a narrow scope opting to put 
together a package of services, without significant implementation barriers, that has the potential for market place adoption. While the 
scope of this basket does not include the more complex or higher risk patient, the objective is that this basket incents providers to 
cooperate and develop innovative ways to deliver this care while improving health care quality and reducing costs. With the proposed 
scope, the subcommittee attempted to capture the average patient and therefore average associated costs. The subcommittee 
engaged in extensive discussion, including literature review regarding the use of a classification that would be useful for providers and 
understandable by patients in determining eligibility for this basket. Originally, the subcommittee considered the use of an ASA score of 
3 or below; however, acknowledging some limitations for use with the ASA classification for this purpose, the subcommittee elected to 
use language in the scope that is consistent with an ASA score of 2 and below, described as follows: “…and determined to have mild or 
no systemic disease…” Additionally, the subcommittee discussed that ideally a mechanism would exist to support a provider/patient 
discussion to jointly determine whether the Basket of Care is appropriate to meet an individual’s needs. The subcommittee 
acknowledges that the criteria of BMI less than 35 is not evidence-based, but rather represents subcommittee consensus and 
addresses those patients most likely to benefit from this Basket of Care. Furthermore in considering the scope, the subcommittee 
elected to limit the upper age to 64 recognizing that the 2008 health care reform law does not apply to services paid for by Medicare, 
state public health care programs through fee-for-service or prepaid arrangements, workers’ compensation, or no-fault automobile 
insurance. A preoperative history and physical is required prior to the surgical procedure, and encouraged to be performed at the 
patient’s health care home for purposes of continuity, but is not included in the basket in order to avoid anticipated administrative 
challenges the subcommittee considered. With regard to the scope end point (90 days after the procedure), the subcommittee added 
clarifying language to indicate that hospital readmissions within that timeframe applicable to this basket, would be limited to those 
resulting from complications involving the surgical site assuming care delivered by the same provider. Lastly, the subcommittee 
acknowledged that while some individuals will not be eligible to receive care within the basket, the care components within the basket 
may guide other’s care as well. 
2 Preoperative phase: A rationale for including pre-surgery education in the basket is the association between decreased length of 
stay and patients understanding expectations prior to admission. 
3 Case management: A rationale for including case management in the basket is the ability for preplanning to reduce unnecessary  
hospital days. 
4 Professional fees: As the basket price is intended to cover a collection of health care services ordinarily combined by a provider in 
delivering a full diagnostic or treatment procedure, it is anticipated that surgeon fees would be included in the basket. The basket 
component includes all of professional fees. 
5 Knee prosthesis: The subcommittee discussed implant cost variation at length. The subcommittee supported the prosthesis cost 
being in the basket believing most patients would expect this to be included in the basket price; however, the subcommittee 
acknowledged that further strategies, such as specific tiering, related to such pricing were beyond the scope of the subcommittee. 
Additionally, the subcommittee acknowledged that the discussion about which prosthesis to use usually occurs as part of the orthopedic 
consultation prior to the start of this basket. 
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 6 Deep-vein thrombosis prophylaxis: Deep-vein thrombosis prophylaxis significantly reduces the risk of postoperative 
thromboembolism; options include mechanical and/or chemical. Additionally, compression devices can control pain and reduce edema. 
7 Facilities: The subcommittee acknowledges the challenge of balancing component specificity against allowing for innovation. The 
subcommittee elected to list components by general categories versus being more prescriptive, allowing for innovation. The 
subcommittee believes strongly that many opportunities exist for innovation in this particular area. 
8 Medications: Prophylactic antibiotics should be limited to 24 hours post procedure. 
9 Pain management: The subcommittee acknowledged the opportunities for innovation as it relates to management of patient 
immediately post-operatively. 
10 Medication consultation: This is intended to describe medical management for medications/conditions not related to the surgery. 
11 Case management: This is included for the purpose of mobilizing the preoperative plan for dispositon or responding to any 
necessary changes. 
12 Postoperative follow-up surgical visits: No specific frequency of visits or modality is defined, allowing for provider determination. 
13 Physical therapy: No specific frequency or length of physical therapy is defined, allowing for provider determination. 
14 Imaging: One outpatient knee film is included as the immediate postoperative film at the hospital may not be of required quality. 
15 Transitional care unit: No specific length of stay or care at a transitional care unit is defined allowing for provider determination. The 
subcommittee believes strongly that many opportunities exist for innovation in this area. 
Source: Total Knee Replacement Basket of Care Subcommittee (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota Department of Health, June 22, 2009), 
available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/baskets/TotalKnee090622_FinalReport.pdf. 
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 NOTES 
 
1 The Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s “Triple Aim” initiative helps organizations 
achieve improvements in these three areas simultaneously. See “Minnesota Health Reform 
Implementation Update” (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota Department of Health, 2009), available at 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/implementation/index.html. 
2 “Administrative Costs at Minnesota Health Plans in 2007” (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota 
Department of Health, Dec. 2008, available at 
http://h1n1resource.net/divs/hpsc/dap/cdireports/grppurch/admn2007.pdf. 
3 Current Population Survey, “2006 to 2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplements,” 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). 
4 D. McCarthy, S. K. H. How, C. Schoen, J. C. Cantor, and D. Belloff, Aiming Higher Results 
from a State Scorecard on Health System Performance, 2009 (New York: The Commonwealth 
Fund, Oct. 2009). 
5 “Administrative Costs in 2007,” 2008. 
6 “Health Care Access Fund (HCAF) Transfer Issues” (St. Paul, Minn.: Fiscal Analysis 
Department, Minnesota House of Representatives, Jan. 2004). 
7 Rural Health Advisory Committee, “The Health Care Access Fund and Provider Tax:  
A Rural Perspective” (St. Paul, Minn.: Office of Rural Health and Primary Care, Minnesota 
Department of Health, Nov. 2000), available at 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/orhpc/pubs/hcaccess.pdf. 
8 Includes premiums, out-of-pocket expenses, and taxes. 
9 “Health Expenditure Data, Health Expenditures by State of Residence” (Washington, D.C.: 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary, National Health Statistics 
Group, released Sept. 2007), available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/res-us.pdf. 
10 J. Sonier, “Health Reform: Minnesota and the Nations,” presentation for the Minnesota 
Department of Health, Sept. 22, 2009. 
11 The specific information about the packages and prices on Carol.com is proprietary, 
accessible only to employers and employees who purchase the service. 
12 “Health Care Quality Measures” (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota Department of Health, 2009), 
available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/measurement/index.html; and “Health 
Care Quality Measures—Proposed Rule” (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota Department of Health, 
2009), available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/measurement/draftrule.html. 
13 Minnesota Medical Association, Minnesota Department of Health, and Minnesota 
Community Measurement, “Quality Measurement and Reporting Web Conference,” Dec. 2009, 
available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/fiscal/files/ibhctxfr.PDF. 
14 Laws of Minnesota for 2008, Ch. 358, Art. 1, Chapter 358–S.F.No. 3780. 
15 http://www.cchconline.org/pdfs/MN_data_elements.pdf. 
16 http://www.mnhospitals.org/index/abouthosp2. 
17 Interview with Jim Chase, President, Minnesota Community Measurement. 
18 Minnesota Statute § 623.536. 
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19 “Administrative Simplification—The New Minnesota Standards,” presentation by the 
Minnesota Administrative Uniformity Committee, available at http://www.mnhima.org/smart05-
bin/public/downloadlibrary?&itemid=86114174841847227467. 
20 “Minnesota’s Statewide Quality Reporting and Incentive Payment Program: Final 
Recommendations to the Minnesota Department of Health” (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota 
Department of Health, March 2009), available at 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/measurement/FinalRecs.pdf. 
21 http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/measurement/qualityrulesrevisor082509.pdf. 
22 Minnesota’s Vision for Health: Quality Measures, “A Guide to the Proposed Rule” (St. 
Paul, Minn.: Minnesota Department of Health, Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/measurement/GuideToProposedRule.pdf. 
23 This description includes a provision passed in 2009 regarding the Medicaid performance 
thresholds. See 2009 Minnesota Statutes 256B.032, Eligible Vendors of Medical Care, available 
at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=256B.032. 
24 “Provider Peer Grouping Recommendations” (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota Department of 
Health, Provider Peer Grouping Advisory Group, Oct. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/peer/advisory_finalreport.pdf. 
25 “Baskets of Care,” (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota Department of Health, March 2009), 
available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/baskets.html. 
26 “Minnesota’s Statewide Quality Reporting and Incentive Payment Program: Final 
Recommendations to the Minnesota Department of Health,” (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota 
Department of Health, March 2009), available at 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/measurement/FinalRecs.pdf; and “Health Care Quality 
Measures—Quality Incentive Payment System,” (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota Department of 
Health, 2009, available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/measurement/qips.html. 
27 “Minnesota’s Statewide Quality Reporting,” 2009. 
28 Detailed information on why this is a stretch goal, and what the spread is, is not available in 
the final report, but it reported as such. 
29 “Minnesota’s Statewide Quality Reporting,” 2009. 
30 The diabetes measures include the percentage of patients ages 18–75 with diabetes  
(Types 1 and 2) who reached all five treatment goals: 
a. HbA1c < 8 
b. Blood pressure < 130/80 
c. Low-density lipoprotein (LDL) < 100 
d. Daily aspirin use 
e. Documented tobacco-free 
31 Measures include heart attack (acute myocardial infarction) care: 
a. Eight measures (seven process measures, plus mortality rates) 
b. Heart failure care: five measures (four process measures, plus mortality rates) 
c. Pneumonia care: eight measures (seven process measures, plus mortality rates) 
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32 Bridges to Excellence is a national pay-for-performance program that participating states 
have tailored for their unique regions. The program brings together employers, coalitions, health 
plans, and physician associations. 
33 Chapter 358—S.F. No. 3780, Article 2, “Health Care Homes,” (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota 
Department of Health, Sept. 2009), available at: 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/homes/documents/HCHLegislation.pdf; and “Health 
Care Homes (aka Medical Homes)—Payment Methodology Development,” Minnesota 
Department of Health, Sept. 2009, available at 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/homes/payment/index.html. 
34 “Health Care Homes (aka Medical Homes),” 2009. 
35 Health Reform Requests for Proposals (RFPs) (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota Department of 
Health), available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/rfp/index.html. 
36 The Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) believes that new designs can and  
must be developed to simultaneously accomplish three critical objectives, or what we call  
the “Triple Aim”: 
• Improve the health of the population; 
• Enhance the patient experience of care (including quality, access, and reliability); and 
• Reduce, or at least control, the per capita cost of care. 
See: http://www.ihi.org/IHI/Programs/StrategicInitiatives/TripleAim.htm. 
37 A partnership of The Commonwealth Fund and AcademyHealth, announced in January 2008. 
38 S. Silow-Carroll and T. Alteras, Value-Driven Health Care Purchasing: Case Study of 
Minnesota’s Smart Buy Alliance (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, Aug. 2007). 
39 A. Robinow. “Patient Choice Health Care Model Case Study,” presentation at the Pay for 
Performance Summit, March 13, 2009, available at http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/pc/ 
2009_03_13__Global_Payments_Patient_Choice_Robinow.ppt. 
40 J, Christianson and R. Feldman. “Evolution in the Buyers Health Care Action Group 
Purchasing Initiative,” Health Affairs, Jan/Feb 2002 21(1):76–88. 
41 Patient Choice, “About Us: Overview,” (Minnetonka, Minn.: Medica, 2007), available at 
http://www.patientchoicehealthcare.com/aboutus/index.html. 
42 Silow-Carroll and Alteras, Value-Driven Health Care Purchasing, 2007. 
43 Minnesota Medical Association. Physician’s Plan for a Healthy Minnesota (Minneapolis, 
Minn.: Minnesota Medical Association), available at 
http://www.mmaonline.net/KeyIssues/HealthCareReform/tabid/90/Default.aspx. 
44 “Healthy Minnesota: A Partnership for Reform,” Healthy Minnesota, available at 
http://www.healthyminnesota.org. [Web site no longer active.] 
45 Healthy Minnesota bill, SF1689/HF1856, available at 
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bin/bldbill.php?bill=S1689.0.html&session=ls85. 
46 “Health Care Reform in Minnesota” (Minneapolis, Minn.: Minnesota Medical Association), 
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47 Minnesota Health Care Transformation Task Force, Recommendations Submitted to 
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Department of Health, Minnesota Health Care Transformation Task Force, Jan. 2008), available 
at http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/hpsc/hep/transform/ttfreportfinal.pdf. 
 50
